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TURUN YLIOPISTO 
Yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta 
Filosofian, poliittisen historian ja valtio-opin laitos 
Poliittinen historia  
Niko Hatakka: Populism in the Hybrid Media System: Populist Radical Right Online 
Counterpublics Interacting with Journalism, Party Politics, and Citizen Activism 
Väitöskirja, 170 s. 
Yhteiskunta- ja käyttäytymistieteiden tohtoriohjelma 
Syyskuu 2019 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tutkimus käsittelee populismin logiikkaa mediajärjestelmässä, jossa perinteinen eliittivetoinen 
tiedonvälitys on kietoutunut monien käsissä olevaan verkkoviestintään. Tutkimus esittää 
diskurssiteoreettisella otteella, miten viestinnällinen vuorovaikutus nykyisessä media-
ympäristössä vaikuttaa puolueiden pyrkimyksiin kerätä laajaa joukkoa erilaisia yhteiskun-
nallisia vaateita yhteisten populististen merkitsijöiden ja poliittisten tunnusten taakse. 
Populistisen verkkoviestinnän sisältöjen sijaan tutkimus keskittyy eri toimijoiden 
vuorovaikutukseen, jonka kautta verkon populistisen viestinnän katsotaan vasta muodostavan 
käsityksiä populistipuolueista: Miten populististen liikkeiden edustama ”kansa” määrittyy, kun 
kuka tahansa voi puhua tai tulla kuulluksi sen äänellä? 
Väitöskirja koostuu johdanto-osuudesta ja neljästä julkaistusta tutkimusartikkelista. 
Suomea, Ruotsia ja Iso-Britanniaa käsittelevissä osatutkimuksissa tarkastellaan verkko-
välitteistä populistista viestintää ja siihen reagointia. Ensimmäisessä artikkelissa tarkastellaan 
poliitikkojen tapoja jakaa ja kehystää uudelleen journalismia osana populistista viestintää 
sosiaalisessa mediassa. Toisessa artikkelissa tarkastellaan populistipuolueisiin liitetyksi tulevan 
verkkovälitteisen viestinnän synnyttämiä rasismikohuja ja erityisesti sitä, miten puolueiden 
edustajat vastaavat näihin kohuihin valtavirran mediassa. Kolmannessa artikkelissa 
tarkastellaan puoluejohdon suhdetta puolueen hyödyntämään kiistanalaisen verkkoyhteisöön, 
ja erityisesti sitä, miten puoluejohdon tapa käsitellä julkisuudessa puolueen ja verkkoyhteisön 
suhdetta vaikuttaa verkkoaktivistien sitoutuneisuuteen. Neljännessä artikkelissa tarkastellaan 
oikeistopopulististen vastajulkisuuksien verkkovälitteistä kansalaislähtöistä valvontaa ja 
vastustusta. 
Tutkimuksen pohjalta esitetään neljä päähavaintoa. Ensinnäkin, nykyisessä media-
järjestelmässä populistista viestintää olisi analyyttisesti järkevä pitää luonteeltaan tekno-
logisesti, organisatorisesti, ideologisesti, ja tyylillisesti sekamuotoisena. Toiseksi, samalla kun 
verkon vastajulkisuudet vapauttavat monimuotoista populistista viestintää, ne altistavat sen 
äärimmäisimpiin muotoihin liitetyiksi tulevia poliittisia toimijoita valvonnalle ja kritiikille. 
Tutkimus osoittaakin, kuinka nykyisen mediajärjestelmän logiikat korostavat populistisen 
viestinnän kaikkein kiistanalaisimpia tapoja esittää ”kansan” ja ”eliitin” jännitteistä suhdetta. 
Kolmanneksi, populististen puolueiden on tehokkainta vastata kiistanalaisten piirteidensä 
korostumiseen laventamalla diskursiivista kuilua ”kansan” ja ”eliitin” välillä. Ja tästä johtuen 
neljänneksi, populismin logiikkaa on vaikea hyödyntää nykyisessä mediajärjestelmässä sillä 
oletuksella, että sen kautta mobilisoituva liike pysyisi rakentavana väylänä perusteltujen 
yhteiskunnallisten vaateiden täyttämiseksi. 
AVAINSANAT: populismi; viestintä; media; sosiaalinen media; journalismi; aktivismi; 
puolueet; radikaalioikeisto; perussuomalaiset  
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ABSTRACT 
Media systems of the 21st century have been described as “hybrid”, referring to flows of 
information being increasingly disseminated, circulated, consumed, and interacted with in 
overlapping publics at various times by multiple actors with multiple voices. This research 
describes how the hybridisation of the media system affects populism as a political logic of 
articulation and how we should take this into consideration when researching populism as a 
political communication phenomenon. The main research question relates to the 
interconnection between populism as a logic of articulating a chain of equivalence and the 
hybrid media environment in which populist communication is being performed and reacted to 
by multiple actors with various agendas: What does it mean for the articulation of “the people” 
when anybody can speak or be perceived to speak in its name? 
The research uses a discourse-theoretical approach to analyse mediated interactions between 
populist-party representatives, journalists, and citizen activists pertaining to populist radical right 
communication taking place in online counterpublics. The study’s main argument is that the logics 
of the hybrid media system affect what populist political communication ends up articulating – 
thus having an effect also on the form and viability of populist movements as a means for political 
change. The research arrives at four main conclusions. First, due to the hybridisation of the media 
system, it would be analytically beneficial to regard populist political communication as 
technologically, organisationally, ideologically, and stylistically hybrid. Second, out of the 
heterogeneous populist political communication emancipated by online counterpublics, it is likely 
that its least-appreciated elements will become the defining characteristic of affiliated 
organisational vehicles in mainstream publics. Third, public scrutiny arising from party 
organisations being affiliated with extreme online communication is most efficiently deflected by 
populist leaders by heightening the boundary of difference between the people and the elite. As 
the logics of the hybrid media system will make populist chains of equivalence brittle unless 
populist leaders adopt confrontational strategies for responding to critique, thus fourth, populist 
parties tend to gravitate towards becoming normalising agents for reciprocal antagonism and anti-
pluralism. This makes populist logic less conducive to being a corrective for democracy. 
The thesis consists of four research articles and a theoretical introduction that engages in 
depth with literature on populism, its relationship with media, and the role of online publics in 
facilitating political action. The four sub-studies investigate populist radical right online 
communication and different actors’ reactions to it in Finland, Sweden, and the UK, but the 
focus of the introduction is on the Finnish case. The first article analyses social media as 
platforms for populist remediation of political news. The second article compares populist 
parties’ media strategies for responding to racism accusations related to online hate speech. The 
third article discusses the political consequences and the necessary discursive negotiation 
caused by populist-party organisations trying to mobilise resources created in controversial 
online communities. And the fourth article investigates networked civic monitoring of online 
populist radical right counterpublics. 
KEYWORDS: populism; political communication; media; social media; journalism; activism; 
parties; populist radical right; Finns Party  
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1 Introduction 
“There is in our future a TV or Internet Populism, in which the emotional 
response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the 
Voice of the People.” (Eco, 1995) 
In 1995, Umberto Eco wrote an anti-fascist essay in which he, among other things, 
contemplated the formation of “the people” in populism. The quotation can be 
regarded as a poignant vision into the future, to a time when populist radical right 
movements bolstered by both older and newer media seem ubiquitous and victorious. 
Eco’s quote is so compelling that it has been used as an epigraph in several books 
discussing the problematic effects of the Internet for democracy (e.g., Bergmann, 
2018; Seymour, 2019). Eco and the authors quoting him are correct in that mediated 
communication is essential for the formation of an idea of “the people”. However, 
in the emerging hybrid media system, the articulation of “the people” is not merely 
a matter of political leaders communicating messages via media and individuals 
identifying with them. What is “presented and accepted as the voice of the people” 
is formed via a multitude of discursive interactions between multiple communicators 
across various media. Therefore to understand what populist claims made in the 
name of “the people” against “the elite” end up articulating, we must analyse how 
populist political communication is shaped by, interpreted in, and engaged with in 
the current media environment. Thus, instead of viewing populism as something that 
is “done” by political actors, this research considers how meaning-making around 
populist claims and articulations functions in an era of media hybridity and how this 
affects the viability of populist movements as means for institutionalising unmet 
societal demands. 
1.1 Research problem 
For anyone following politics, it must be clear that the world is going through a 
“populist zeitgeist” (Mudde, 2004) or a series of “populist moments” (Mouffe, 2018) 
during which especially nationalist right-wing populist parties and movements have 
made impressive gains. In the past four decades, European right-wing populist 
parties have, on average, doubled their share of votes (Inglehart and Norris, 2016: 
Introduction 
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23). In 2018, it was estimated that one in four Europeans vote for a party viewed as 
populist (Lewis et al., 2018). The list of political events pertaining to the rise of 
populist movements with nativist and authoritarian ideological contents and abrasive 
political styles is extensive. Just since 2016, the Hungarian liberal democracy has 
been put in jeopardy as Fidesz gained a supermajority, in the United States Donald 
Trump was elected president, the Brexit referendum led to the United Kingdom 
starting the process to leave the European Union, the Austrian FPÖ regained a place 
in the government and came in second in the presidential election, in Norway the 
Progress Party re-entered the government, in Italy Lega and the 5 Star Movement 
united to form a government, in Poland and France populist radical right parties 
enjoyed largest electoral victories in their histories, in Sweden the Sweden 
Democrats’ electoral victory postponed the formation of a government for months, 
and in Finland the Finns Party1 has remained a significant parliamentary party 
despite its newly elected populist radical right leadership having caused a 
governmental crisis leading to the party splitting up in 2017. 
Populism scholars have approached populism by regarding it as a political logic 
of articulation or discourse (Laclau, 2005), as a thin-centred ideology or a set of ideas 
(Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Hawkins, 2018), as a political style or a 
performative means of mobilising support (Moffitt, 2016; Jansen, 2011; Ylä-Anttila, 
2017), and as communication (de Vreese et al., 2018; Reinemann et al., 2017). This 
thesis regards populism as a logic of discursive articulation that is inherently bound 
to communication and discourse and therefore is interested in the role of media in 
the production, dissemination, and public scrutiny of populist talk and performance. 
Until the 2000s, the media system was viewed as comprising the print press, 
television, and radio (Bennett, 1990; Castells, 2007: 240). Now, the view is that the 
widespread adoption of Internet-mediated communication has lowered the threshold 
for political participation, facilitated issue-specific collective action, increased 
interaction between different actors, and even changed some of the internal logics 
through which political movements form (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Chadwick, 
2013; Treré, 2019). Regarding populism especially, it has been suggested that social 
media provide counterpublics for political movements to raise attention to unmet 
social and political demands (e.g., Dahlgren, 2013; Fenton, 2016; Mouffe, 2013; 
Gerbaudo, 2012). The online voicing of previously unaddressed grievances has been 
regarded to foster new political consciousness that creates incentives, resources, and 
momentum for political changes that might not have had institutional channels 
 
 
1  The original English translation for the party’s name was “the True Finns”. The party 
changed the translation of the name in 2011 to “the Finns”. “True Finns” is still used 
by some scholars (e.g., Jungar, 2016), but, in this study, the party is referred to as “the 
Finns party”. 
Niko Hatakka 
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earlier – leading in turn to the reinvigoration of radical democracy (Mouffe, 2013; 
Fenton, 2016). Even though media are essential in the articulation and mobilisation 
of grievances to form political action, in populism research both traditional and 
newer media have largely been regarded as mere platforms for the broadcasting and 
adoption of political messages (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2018). Despite the connection 
between online communication technologies and populism is an increasingly salient 
topic of discussion in journalism and in academia, little research has been done on 
how the media environment affects the processes of discursive articulation that lie at 
the core of populist movements (Engesser et al., 2017; Krämer, 2017b). 
The rise of populism – regardless of whether it is considered to be a set of ideas, 
a thin-centred ideology, a discourse, a political style, or a form of communication – 
has been given mostly structural explanations. The popularity of movements that 
question various elites have been explained, first of all, by the increase of economic 
disparity in society. According to the so-called losers of globalisation theory (Betz, 
1994), the working middle class has not become wealthier at the same ratio as the 
least and most well-off economic classes (Piketty, 2014). As a result, the perceived 
economic hardships have been interpreted as providing populist parties and 
movements with easily usable discursive windows of opportunity (Taggart, 2004: 
275). The second often-presented explanation is related to the hollowing of 
democracy or the so-called crisis of liberal democracy (Mair, 2013). This 
phenomenon encompasses a multitude of different political trends, including 
decreasing party attachment (Kölln, 2014), the detachment of political power from 
national parliaments to supranational political entities and corporations (Kriesi et al. 
2006), the increasing electoral volatility (Borg, 2015), the ideological convergence 
of mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties (Mair, 2013), the political centre’s 
failure to communicate its conservative stances (Lochocki, 2017), the overall 
dissatisfaction with the perceived inability of parliamentary institutions to respond 
to citizens’ concerns and worries (Streeck, 2014), and the increased mediation of 
political crises and corruption scandals that gnaw away at the legitimacy of the 
political establishment in stable liberal democracies (Kantola et al., 2011). Another 
popular explanation has been the so-called cultural backlash theory, according to 
which the rise of right-wing populism is a result of a comeback of conservative 
values as a response to the hegemony of liberal ideology and policies of 
contemporary societies (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Some political scientists, like 
Eatwell and Goodwin (2018), have even explained the success and rise of the 
populist radical right by referring to the existence of grievances experienced by the 
parties’ supporters, suggesting that such perceptions should be regarded as 
depictions of reality. 
Even though structural explanations for the rise of populism have merit in 
explaining why populist movements have traction, these explanations do not really 
Introduction 
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engage in inquiring how populist ideas become associated with particular political 
movements. Especially when explaining populism as the result of perceived 
grievances, one dismisses that no populist actor in any context is automatically a 
channel through which any grievance-related protest can manifest. Even if the socio-
political soil were ripe for the demand for populism to rise, this does not mean that 
populist actors would thrive solely on this demand. For the demand for populism to 
turn into action and to have an impact on the political status quo, there has to be time 
and space for the carrying out of a discursive process in which an actor – be it a 
political leader, a civic movement, a political party, a loose citizen movement, or 
some other organisational vehicle – unites various demands and grievances to form 
a political entity that can try to challenge the existing order with which people are 
discontent (Laclau, 2005). This means that to analyse how the demand and supply 
of populism meet in contemporary societies, we should look at populism as a 
political logic of articulation (Laclau, 2005) and as a communication phenomenon 
(Esser et al., 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018; Waisbord, 2018). 
According to Ernesto Laclau (2005), populism is a logic of articulation in which 
actors discursively bring political subjects and objects into being via the construction 
of antagonism between “a people” and “the elites” (see also de Cleen and 
Stavrakakis, 2017; Stavrakakis, 2017). Laclau therefore suggests that historical 
subjects emerge via the construction of ideas of “us” and “them” – more precisely 
via the discursive articulation of the conflictual relationship and the oppositional 
characteristics of empty signifiers that are often, but not always, referred to as “the 
people” and “the elites”. A populist actor must rise and claim to represent multiple 
and heterogeneous grievances as a totality (Laclau, 2005), appointing oneself as the 
representative of a unitary “people” against “elites” and “others” that are actively 
trying to deny the people’s justified right to sovereignty (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 
2008: 3). Populism can therefore be regarded as a contextually varying political logic 
of articulation that unifies groups and individuals in imagined alliances to advance 
unmet societal demands (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 2005). These “chains of 
equivalence” are bound together by discursive core ideas and symbolic performances 
that turn various actors with various demands and grievances into a “people”, a 
unitary political subject that organises around an empty signifier such as a political 
leader, party, or movement to wield counterpower against the hegemonic order 
(Laclau, 2005). 
By “articulation”, Laclau (2005) refers to the discursive process in which things 
get their meaning through acts of signification. This process is essential to the 
formation of equivalential chains that unite unmet social demands, and it takes place 
through mainly mediated language, discourse, rhetoric, and communication of both 
political content and style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; 
Moffitt, 2016; Reinemann et al., 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018). Taking into 
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consideration that populist ideas cannot be separated from their discursive 
construction, it is useful to regard ideas of “the people” and “the elites” as a series 
of signification acts that can also be regarded as pieces of communication. 
Regardless of their evident overlap, there has been little effort to connect the 
Laclaudian discourse-theoretical conception of populism as a political logic of 
articulation to the communication approach, which until now has vested its 
understanding of populism as a pre-existing set of ideas that are mainly reflected in, 
but not manifested and brought to life via, communication (e.g., Hawkins, 2018; 
Hawkins and Castanho Silva, 2018). Populist political communication (de Vreese et 
al., 2018; Reinemann et al., 2017) has been regarded as consisting of the rhetorical 
expression of the thin ideational core of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 
2017) – anti-elitism, people-centrism, and the sovereignty of the people’s will – and 
of populist stylistic characteristics such as the rejection of the conventions of elite 
discourse and the use of narratives of crisis and threat (Moffitt, 2016). As Laclau is 
vague about the practical details of how populism as a logic of articulation facilitates 
the organisation of counterpower via discourse and various acts of signification, the 
communication approach has been a more than welcome addition to populism 
research. 
The so-called politics of signification (Hall, 1982) – that is, the process in which 
discursive negotiation over social identities and their relationships takes place 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105; Laclau, 2005: 68) – is today largely mediated (Esser 
and Strömbäck, 2014). Therefore, populist communication and the articulation of 
chains of equivalence are also things that take place in mediated form. Thus, it is no 
surprise that scholars of populism have gradually begun to regard the role of 
mediated communication as prevalently essential in establishing, disseminating, and 
gaining support for populist ideas (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017; Moffitt, 2016: Chapter 
5; Krämer, 2017a; 2018). The latest global phenomenal success of the populist 
radical right coincides with the rise in the popularity of social media and the increase 
of the societal impact of Internet-mediated communication. Still, the extant main 
theoretical discussion concerning the relationship of media and populism does not 
really distinguish different types of media and is yet to properly acknowledge online 
media (e.g., Esser et al., 2017: 376–378). When it does so, social media are often 
assigned excessive responsibility for the rise of populism. 
To an extent, new digital media, like the legacy media (Mazzoleni, 2008), have 
been regarded as platforms for the direct transmission and adoption of right-wing 
populist messages directly from populist leaders to populist voters (de Vreese et al., 
2018: 432). In the time of the floating signifiers “fake news” and “post truth” (Farkas 
and Schou, 2018), social media have been often journalistically regarded as a 
primary contributing factor to the popularity of populist politicians and parties (e.g., 
Bartlett, 2018). In particular, the moral panic regarding the role of targeted digital 
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political marketing in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and the 
Trump campaign has revealed the appeal of understanding social media as mind-
control machinery (Simon, 2018; Vaidhyanathan, 2018) that can be used by illiberal 
actors to turn citizens involuntarily and against their best interests into tools for 
undermining liberal democracy. I claim that these kinds of narratives contribute to 
understanding the rise of populism from a techno-determinist perspective as they 
represent populism as a technologically manifested pathology for which different 
actors’ interactions and the previous theoretical work on the relationship of populism 
and media appear irrelevant. The Internet as media technology is thus often 
preloaded with a black-box-type expectation of it providing an all-encompassing 
explanation for the rise of populism. Therefore, by adopting this explanation, we 
would sidestep many of the more interesting questions pertaining to the current 
media environment’ effects on – not the success of populist movements – but their 
form. This doctoral thesis investigates how the Internet has affected the ways 
populist acts of signification are made public and how they are responded to, as well 
as what this potentially means for the characteristics, democratic potential, and 
viability of populist mobilisations. 
1.2 Research questions and sub-studies 
We currently lack explanations for how the Internet contributes to the mediation of 
populism as a logic of articulation in the current media environment. Instead of 
assuming that online platforms are isolated informational ecosystems that act as 
counterpublics for disseminating alternative information, according to de Vreese et 
al. (2018) we should look at “social media platforms in context, as platforms of 
sharing, disseminating, emphasising, escalating, and expressing views as part of a 
larger information system” (p. 432). This doctoral thesis analyses populism as a 
political logic of articulation in a media system where traditional elite-driven news 
production has become intertwined with horizontal online political communication. 
Media systems of the 21st century have been referred to by Andrew Chadwick (2013; 
2017) as “hybrid”, referring to the liminal characteristics of how information is 
disseminated, circulated, consumed, and interacted with in overlapping publics at 
various times by multiple actors with multiple voices and agendas. This research is 
especially interested in how populist political communication taking place in online 
counterpublics interacts with and is interacted with by other actors in the hybrid 
media system, including the legacy media, institutional political actors, and citizen 
activists. The main question of the thesis therefore relates to the interconnection 
between populism as a logic of articulating chains of equivalence and the hybrid 
media environment that provides the main stage on which populism is being 
discursively performed and reacted to by multiple actors with various agendas. If 
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populism is regarded as a discursive pursuit of establishing the “people” and its 
antagonistic relationship with the “elite”, it should be clear that this process is 
susceptible to various kinds of interventions when the core ideas of a populist 
movement are communicated not by a single actor on a single platform but by 
multiple actors with multiple voices based on differing motivations and 
understandings of desirable goals and appropriate means of action. In other words, 
how does the hybridisation of the media system affect populism as a political logic 
of articulation? 
The hybrid media system – as an idea – points out that it is not simply the reach 
or persuasiveness of online political communication that has started to affect politics. 
Instead we should take in consideration the intertwining of online communication 
with traditional media, and how the hybrid media system facilitates discursive 
interconnections between multiple actors involved in the larger communicational 
system (Chadwick, 2013). Trying to analyse populism as a political logic of 
articulation in the hybrid media environment is not just a question of the 
characteristics of populist online movements or the ideological or stylistic contents 
of populist communication. Following Chadwick, what matters in the hybrid media 
system is the mediated interconnectedness of different actors’ public acts of 
signification regarding populist communication. As Chadwick (2013) argues, the 
hybrid media system itself is created in the relationships between actors in society. 
Therefore, when looking at how the hybridisation of information flow contributes to 
populism as a logic of articulation, we should look at how populist communication 
is being produced, circulated and reacted to, not only in populist online 
counterpublics, but also in the wider media system where politicians, journalists, and 
activists interact with populist acts of signification. When looking at populism as a 
discursive logic of articulating “the people” and “the elites” and their characteristics, 
the theory of the hybrid media system provides a way to analyse the actual politics 
of signification that can be regarded as manifesting the ontology of populism in a 
particular historical context. 
This doctoral thesis uses a qualitative discourse-theoretical approach to analyse 
communicative interactions between populist-party representatives, populist radical 
right online activists, political journalists, and the opponents of populist movements. 
The aim is to gain insight on the role of the hybrid media system in the process in 
which populism manifests as a logic of discursive articulation. How has the 
increasingly prevalent role of the Internet in the circulation of information in society 
and the increased communicative interactions between various actors affected how 
populist ideas and points of identification are created, disseminated, and responded 
to in the public sphere? What does the hybridisation of the media system mean for 
the overall process of communicating what populist movements represent, and how 
does this affect the perceptions of and reactions to populist mobilisations? 
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Furthermore, what does the hybrid media system mean for the implications that 
populism as a logic of articulation has for democracy – does the hybridity of the 
media system make populism more of a threat or a corrective (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2012; Laclau, 2005; Stavrakakis, 2018) to democracy? And last, how 
should we take the hybridity of media systems into consideration when researching 
populism and its relationship with media? 
The dissertation’s main theoretical research task focuses on populism, based on 
an original theoretical framework that combines several populism research 
approaches. Put briefly, by “populism” I refer to the articulation process through 
which political actors are discursively assigned the position as representatives of “the 
people” via the communication (and scrutiny) of populist thin-ideology and populist 
style. The selected approach and the definitions of pertinent terminology are 
presented in detail in the second main chapter. The main research question about 
populism in the hybrid media system is empirically operationalized in the context of 
the populist radical right in three countries. According to Cas Mudde (2007), “the 
populist radical right” refers to a group of political actors that combine populism 
with at least nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism refers to an ideology that holds 
that states should be inhabited by members of the national group, and that non-
national elements should be regarded as threat to the unity of the nation. 
Authoritarianism refers to supporting strictly ordered and policed society in which 
criminals should have fewer rights and in which social problems should be regarded 
as security issues. (Mudde, 2017: 4) However, there are different kinds of populisms 
and populist actors, and their character depends on the ideological and stylistic 
elements utilized in communicating the discursive divide between “the people” and 
“the elite” in different contexts. Therefore, it has to be stressed, I do not regard that 
populism can or should be equated with, for example, nativism, authoritarianism, 
nationalism, or any other individual ideological (or stylistic) contents that populism 
becomes contextually entangled with. Even though the empirical focus in this 
research is set on the populist radical right, the dissertation is not theoretically only 
about how radical right populism operates in the contemporary media environment. 
The main theoretical contribution concerning the functioning of populism as a 
political logic of articulation in the hybrid media system can – and should – be 
applied also to other contexts and types of populism. Therefore the literature review 
focuses on the extant discussions concerning populism in general, not just its right-
wing or radical right forms. 
The theoretical introduction to the sub-studies focuses on Finland, but this 
dissertation should not be regarded as a descriptive study of the Finns Party or the 
Finnish online populist radical right. The analytical focus is framed by the 
functioning of populism as a logic of discursive articulation in the hybrid media 
system rather than the context-specific manifestations, actors, backgrounds, and 
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contents of Finnish mediated populism. The aim of the sub-studies and the 
theoretical introduction is to analyse how the Internet has provided alternative means 
of political organisation and how populist parties and online protest movements with 
controversial views, unorthodox political styles, and abrasive communication 
strategies interact with more mainstream publics. Thus, the aim of the study is to not 
only highlight the interaction between different actors engaging in and with populist 
online communication but to provide insight on how the hybridity of contemporary 
media systems affects how populism is disseminated and reacted to and on how in 
the process populism articulates chains of equivalence. Based on this research task, 
this introduction aims to link previous discussions on populism and update them to 
accommodate the contemporary media environment in which populist logic 
currently operates. In the theoretical introduction, this is done by addressing and 
linking relevant research approaches to populism to research pertaining to the 
hybridisation of the media system and to research on online environments as 
facilitators and shapers of political action. 
The thesis consists of four research articles and a theoretical introduction. Instead 
of analysing the contents of online populist political communication as such, the 
research focuses empirically on the multi-actor discursive interactions through 
which populist acts of signification are being formulated, circulated, and reacted to 
in the hybrid media system. The four sub-studies investigate populist online 
communication and different actors’ reactions to it in Finland, Sweden, and the UK. 
Articles III and IV include only the Finnish case, Article I includes Finland and the 
UK, and Article II compares Finland, Sweden, and the UK. The methods employed 
in the individual sub-studies include qualitative and quantitative content analysis, 
frame analysis, and political discourse analysis. The analysed materials and data sets 
include pieces of mainstream journalism, social media data from populist politicians 
from Finland and the UK, and data from online anti-immigration activist groups and 
anti-radical-right activist groups in Finland. 
Article I analyses how politicians of the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, PS) and 
the UK Independence Party (UKIP) have used journalistic representations of 
economic crises to communicate a populist understanding of the news flow regarding 
the Eurozone crisis between 2010 and 2015. The study looks at Facebook as a 
platform for populist remediation of political news, focusing on how populist actors 
use social media to remediate, reframe, and ideologically reconfigure news produced 
by the legacy media. The article informs us that, in the hybrid media system, pieces 
of journalism can be appropriated to support populist political communication via 
selective news sharing of confirmatory stories and reframing of dissonant stories. 
This suggests theoretically that the framing power provided by social media allows 
the populist remediation of journalistic content regardless of the original frames. 
This highlights that, in trying to understand the connection between journalistic 
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frames and the support for populist actors perceived to benefit from mediated crises, 
one should not only look at journalistic content but also at how that content is 
appropriated to support populist communication online. 
Article II analyses how the visibility of populist radical right online 
communication makes populist parties susceptible to becoming targets for 
journalistic scrutiny and how populist parties respond to this scrutiny in the 
mainstream media in Finland, Sweden, and the UK. By providing a comparative 
analysis of the populist-party representatives’ media strategies for responding to 
racism accusations derived from the parties’ perceived association with racist online 
speech, the study provides a typology of the discursive strategies populist parties use 
to respond to such accusations. The article suggests that populist-party 
representatives circumvent direct association with scrutinised – and publicly 
deplored – online speech by combining submissive and confrontational damage-
control strategies in ways that communicate an ambivalent stance towards the party’s 
association with controversial online activism. 
Article III expands on the theme, analysing how cooperation with online 
movements can provide traditional populist-party organisations with significant 
resources but also how they force the party leadership to take considerable pains to 
communicate in the mainstream media in a way that allows them to use the resources 
without losing the trust of the general public. Focusing on the interactions between 
journalists, the Finns Party leadership, and users of the anti-immigration platform 
Hommaforum, the study discusses the communicational consequences of populist-
party organisations mobilising resources created in controversial online 
communities. The article highlights that, in most cases, the journalistic scrutiny of 
controversial characteristics of populist communication does not create conflict 
between a moderate leadership and a more extreme online faction unless the party 
leadership is forced to unequivocally distance the party organization from the acts of 
signification causing controversy. 
Article IV analyses civic monitoring that targets online populist radical right 
anti-immigration activism in Finland to discuss whether outsourcing such 
monitoring to platform users is a feasible means of responding to exclusionary 
populist online communication. The study reveals that the materiality and visibility 
of online anti-immigration action allows it to be monitored by anti-radical-right 
activists to a certain extent and that online action aimed at resisting the prevalence 
of online radical right activism ranges from civil counter-arguing and the pursuit of 
deliberation to anti-racist hate speech and naming-and-shaming campaigns. That 
said, there are notable caveats that undermine the efficacy and viability of civic 
monitoring as a means of scrutinizing populist radical right online action. The main 
problems are related to the connective and anti-populist nature of the civic 
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monitoring that allows it to be used as fuel for populist victimisation campaigns in 
the online setting and to the potential harm to the activists involved. 
1.3 Background: The Finns Party and the Finnish 
online populist radical right 
The theme of this theoretical introduction focuses on the context of (radical) right 
populism in Finland, where the Finns Party’s path from its centre-leftist anti-
establishment populist beginnings towards becoming a nativist populist party has 
intertwined with forms of populist radical right online anti-immigration activism 
(Horsti and Nikunen, 2013; Maasilta, 2012: 14–15; Mäkinen, 2017; Ylä-Anttila, 
2017; Niemi, 2013; Vaarakallio, 2015). The Finns Party was formed in 1995 on the 
ruins of the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue, SMP) that had 
combined socio-economically centre-leftist rural populism with traditional 
conservative values (Arter, 2012; Ruostetsaari, 2011). The Finns Party’s rise from a 
relatively unknown political party to the second largest parliamentary party in 2015 
was personalised in the leadership of Timo Soini (Niemi, 2013), who was party 
leader for two decades between 1997 and 2017. The Finns Party was founded to be 
distinct from the SMP, but party leader Soini was heavily influenced by the populist 
rhetorical style of his personal idol and mentor, the SMP leader Veikko Vennamo 
(Soini, 2008). Whereas Vennamo’s and SMP’s “people” referred to the 
underprivileged rural folk of the Finnish periphery, Soini and the Finns Party 
advocated for the “forgotten people” of Finnish semi-urban cities and suburbs (Soini, 
2008; Niemi, 2013). Soini’s self-declared populist rhetoric (Soini, 2008) focused on 
defending the average working taxpayer against the wrongdoings of morally corrupt 
“old parties” and EU-elites (Arter, 2010: 488–494; Palonen, 2017). Soini supported 
conservative values such as the traditional family model, but at no point during his 
political career did he publically regard immigration as a high-priority topic (Niemi, 
2013; Palonen, 2017). 
The Finns Party elected its first member to parliament in the 1999 parliamentary 
elections, and in 2003 the number of Finns Party MPs elected went up to three with 
the help of the significant number of votes brought in by the party’s first anti-
immigration candidate, Tony Halme. Apart from Halme’s candidacy (Mattlar, 
2009), immigration was not especially salient in the party’s programmes until the 
2007 and, especially, the 2011 elections (Ruostetsaari, 2011). The party’s first 
significant electoral victory was in the European parliamentary elections of 2009, 
when it gained nearly 10 per cent of the national vote aided by the media’s interest 
in Timo Soini’s unconventional vernacular populist style (Niemi, 2013; Arter, 2010: 
488). In the 2011 elections, the Finns Party achieved one of the most significant 
electoral victories in Finnish political history. Supported by the media salience of the 
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Eurozone crisis and a political scandal pertaining to election funding (Ylä-Anttila 
and Ylä-Anttila, 2015; Kantola et al., 2011), the party gained 19.05 per cent of cast 
votes and 39 seats in the 200-seat Finnish parliament to become the country’s third 
largest parliamentary party. According to survey studies, the Finns Party voters’ 
party selection was influenced especially by their wish to protest against established 
parties and to oppose Finnish EU and immigration policies (Borg, 2012a; Borg, 
2012b: 243). Of the Finns Party’s selected candidates, nine campaigned on an anti-
immigration agenda (Horsti and Nikunen, 2013). After refusing to join a government 
with the National Coalition Party, the Finns Party remained in the opposition for the 
entire electoral cycle. In 2015, the party retained its support, losing only one seat in 
parliament with 17.65 per cent of the vote. It then joined a coalition government with 
the Centre Party and the Coalition Party. 
The Finns Party’s rise to eventually becoming a governmental party coincided 
with the formation of a loose political movement whose supporters identified 
themselves as “immigration sceptics” (Horsti and Nikunen, 2013; Hannula, 2011). 
This loose movement was originally organised around networks of bloggers and 
activists on discussion platforms in the 2000s and then later spread to social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter in the 2010s. The movement eventually 
fuelled the founding of a series of populist radical right activist groups, alternative 
media, and even political parties (Hannula, 2011; Ylä-Anttila, 2018; Noppari et al., 
2019). As the various “immigration sceptical” online publics have operated under 
so-called connective logic (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013), they mostly have not had 
official party affiliations and have been linked to political parties only via individual 
party members or representatives. One of the original core online counterpublics for 
discussing problems related to immigration was Hommaforum, which originally 
formed in 2008 around the blog of Jussi Halla-aho, a scholar of linguistics and the 
most well-known “immigration sceptic” in Finland. Halla-aho had founded his blog, 
Scripta – Writings from the Sinking West, in 2003, and the blog became a hub for 
thousands of people who wanted to discuss perceived problems relating especially 
to multiculturalism, immigration policy, cultural Marxism, and Islam. In 2008, the 
blog’s popular comment section was transformed into a separate online portal named 
Hommaforum by a group of the blog’s active readers and commentators (Hannula, 
2011). Halla-aho’s success as an online opinion leader was also manifested outside 
the online environment when he became a nonpartisan candidate for the Finns Party 
in the 2008 municipal elections. Despite his lack of a proper offline campaign and 
his marginal media publicity, he was among the 20 most voted candidates in the 
whole country (Horsti and Nikunen, 2013: 496). Later, Halla-aho would become a 
Finns Party MP in 2011, an MEP in 2014, and finally party leader in 2017. 
The ideas of the “immigration sceptical” movement had to be discursively 
created, disseminated, popularised, and mainstreamed before they had significant 
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political value for any political party. As Niko Pyrhönen (2015) has described it, 
online publics have been essential in “consolidating populist advocacy as a resonant 
collective identity via the mobilisation of exclusionary narratives” in Finland. The 
“immigration sceptical” identity, brought to life in overlapping online 
counterpublics, has been instrumental in the discursive construction of populist 
radical right signifiers that have been used in articulating chains of equivalence 
outside, within, and parallel to the Finns Party (Horsti and Nikunen, 2013; Mäkinen, 
2017). These signifiers are populist radical right in the sense that they have been 
observed to attach populism in various combinations not only to nativism and 
authoritarianism but also to welfare chauvinism, islamophobia, xenophobia, 
misogyny, and racism (Horsti and Nikunen, 2013; Horsti, 2016; Pyrhönen, 2015; 
Vaarakallio, 2015). By focusing on immigration as a threat to Finnish and European 
culture, populist radical right online counterpublics have been used to create a shared 
framing through a division in which the leftist elites’ pandering to dangerous 
immigrants is an acute threat that needs immediate solving (Pyrhönen, 2015). 
The core research problem of this thesis revolves around the process of how 
online counterpublics interacting with party politics, journalism, and activism 
contribute to the articulation of chains of equivalence – in other words, how populist 
logic plays out in the hybrid media system. The Finns Party’s ability to carve itself 
a niche in the Finnish parliamentary system has been partly based on the mediated 
discursive appropriation of “immigration sceptic” demands as part of the party’s 
chain of equivalence, that is, the list of societal demands expressed by the Vox Populi 
and championed by the party. I claim that this appropriation has taken place not only 
via the use of shared “immigration sceptical” terminology and the provision of 
candidacies for “immigration sceptics”, but also through the interactive journalistic 
and civic amplification of these discursive elements in the media system, 
crystallising “immigration skepticism” as a core element of the Finns Party’s 
collective identity and public image.  
Following two years in government, on 10 June 2017 the Finns Party congress 
elected Jussi Halla-aho – the discursive leader of the party’s anti-immigration online 
faction – as the new party leader and three of his avid supporters (Laura Huhtasaari, 
Teuvo Hakkarainen, and Juho Eerola) as vice-chairmen to the party. The other 
coalition partners, the Centre Party and the Coalition Party, declared that the new 
leadership did not enjoy the trust of the other governmental parties, which would 
mean a governmental crisis. Three days later, 20 out of the 38 Finns Party MPs 
resigned from the parliamentary group to protest the comprehensive take-over of the 
party leadership. The underlying conflict between the party’s two factions that had 
been brewing for years (Jungar, 2016; Ylä-Anttila, 2017: 27–29; Article III) 
culminated in the SMP’s populist tradition, exemplified by ex-leader Timo Soini, 
losing the party to the populist radical right faction via a fully legitimate party 
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congress election. In the parliamentary elections of 2019, the Finns Party ran on a 
heavily immigration-focused party platform with nativist and welfare-nationalist 
emphases (Finns Party, 2018: 2–5, 10; 2019a: 3–5; 2019b; 2019c: 5; 2019d: 1, 3, 4–
5, 8; 2019e: 1, 3–4, 6–13, 15). 
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2 Combining approaches to populism 
In journalism and political rhetoric, “populism” is often used as a derogatory term to 
discredit opportunistic views or put down ideas with which the speaker disagrees. 
This suggests that, in its everyday use, populism is a floating signifier, one often ill-
defined and used pejoratively (Bale et al., 2011; Herkman, 2017; Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2018: 1668; Kovala and Palonen, 2018). Despite the significant 
convergence, especially in the latter 2010s, in the different research approaches to 
and definitions of populism, it is often suggested that populism is a contested or 
vaguely defined term also within academia (e.g., Kavada, 2018: 742). The main 
approaches to populism in research have regarded populism as a set of ideas or a thin 
ideology (Mudde, 2004; Hawkins, 2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), as a 
political logic of discursive articulation (Laclau, 2005), as a political style (Moffitt 
and Tormey, 2014: Moffitt, 2016), and as a form of political communication 
(Engesser et al., 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018). These approaches look at populism 
from slightly different angles, but there is increasing overlap between the traditions, 
and, in more than one sense, they are complementary. Therefore, interdisciplinary 
research that tries to grasp populism as a communication phenomenon would benefit 
from combining the insights from several existing theoretical approaches to 
populism (Sengul, 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Until now, the 
communication approach has implemented previous theories of populism as a thin 
ideology and as a political style (Engesser et al., 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018) but 
has not engaged much with the discourse-theoretical approach of the Essex School 
even though their premise of regarding populism as a phenomenon related to 
signification is similar. 
What all the approaches have in common is they regard populism as extant ideas 
or ongoing discursive formulations or negotiations over ideas that suggest that 
society is divided into two camps: “the people” and “the elite”. Whether populism is 
regarded as a discursive logic, frame, strategy, or set of ideas, it discursively 
simplifies the political playing field by constructing ideas of society being divided 
into two oppositional camps, one of which represents the people, whose will should 
be raised to the forefront of making political decisions (Laclau, 2005; Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012: 8; Canovan 1999: 3). Populist talk suggests that the people 
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should be sovereign instead of the elites and, apart from the Essex School, that the 
people should be regarded as “good” and the elite “corrupt” (Mudde, 2018; Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). In all the approaches, the processes in which these 
camps are identified can take place in various political, cultural, social, and historical 
contexts (see, e.g., de la Torre and Anselmi, 2018). This means that different 
movements in different contexts share the ideational or discursive framework for 
populism but build on this framework with different contents: namely, who the 
people and elites are, what their main characteristics are, and what is the main 
problem related to the elites not acknowledging or allowing the people to become 
sovereign. As Emilia Palonen (2018a: 4) puts it, populism gets its content when it 
“becomes entangled with other things”, which are mainly ideological, contextual, 
and stylistic contexts. Because of this, the democratic value of populism is regarded 
by most researchers as ambivalent since populism can be both a threat and a 
corrective for democracy (Laclau, 2005; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2011; Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). 
Regardless of their similarities, there are also some core differences between the 
mainstream research perspectives. As this thesis relies mostly on the ideational, 
style, discursive, and communication approaches, the insights and differences of 
these traditions are addressed in more detail in the three following subsections. The 
thin-ideological or ideational approach is pertinent to the argument and context of 
this thesis because of its ability to inform us about what populist ideas are. The 
approach has been invested in explaining populism as an ontology, in a sense trying 
to boil populism down to the minimal ideological core shared by all populist 
movements and identifying which actors should be regarded as populist. The 
Laclaudian approach of the Essex School, instead of being interested in pinpointing 
the minimal ontological requirements for populism or who the populists are, has been 
more interested in “what populism does” by suggesting that populism is a formal 
discursive logic for how social relations are articulated and, thus, a “royal road to 
understanding (...) the political” (Laclau, 2005: 67). As Laclau’s theory on populism 
is based on discourse theory, it has paved the way for formulating theories on 
populism, not as pre-set ideas but as something that can be observed in political style 
(Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Moffitt, 2016) and in political communication (Jagers and 
Walgrave, 2007; Esser et al., 2017). 
Approaches that regard populism as style or communication are most useful for 
analysing populism as discourse that takes place in mediated form in the hybrid 
media system. I view this distinction of populism as discourse as extremely 
important because I agree with the assertion that it is not possible to separate the 
thin-ideological core of populism from how populism manifests in rhetoric, style, 
and political communication (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 334–338). These research 
traditions have made it possible to analyse how populism operates in action (e.g., 
Niko Hatakka 
26 
Ylä-Anttila, 2017) and how populism is produced, communicated, and performed in 
various publics by various actors. The communication approach, which combines 
core insights from the ideational and the populism-as-style approaches, provides an 
excellent means for analysing the content and manifestations of populist discourse 
in media. But for this approach to inform us about “what populism does” and how 
the logics of the contemporary media environment affect the articulation of populist 
movements, the current communication approach to populism has to be theoretically 
connected to the Essex School’s discourse-theoretical approach. 
2.1 Populism as a political logic of articulation 
The so-called Essex School approaches populism as a political logic of discursive 
articulation, based on the discourse-theoretical theory of populism coined by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and originally developed in the context of left-wing 
politics (Laclau, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The Essex School views populism 
as part of a wider linguistic culture that shapes our socio-political world and that 
continuously evolves in interaction with other ideas and the material environment 
(Laclau, 2005). The post-structural discourse-theoretical background of the approach 
suggests that no idea regarding society or its members’ relationships is natural or 
normal (or even extant) without first having been articulated into being (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985). According to Laclau (2005), populism is thus a political logic of 
articulation in which the speakers create an idea of “us” and “them” that is most often 
referred to as “the people” and “the elite”. According to Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis (2014), the Essex School has thus focused on the processes through 
which populism articulates social meaning “with an emphasis on the political and 
often antagonistic character that different discourses acquire through their 
articulation around distinct nodal points (such as ‘the people’) and their 
differentiation from other discourses in a bid to hegemonise the public sphere and to 
influence decision-making” (p. 122). Therefore, by populist discourse the Essex 
School refers not to populist stylistic characteristics (e.g., political incorrectness) or 
underlying populist attitudes (e.g., anti-elitism) but to series of signification practices 
that articulate in- and out-group identities via the discursive construction of 
antagonism and the establishment of a clear frontier of difference (Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis, 2014: 122). 
The core argument of the Laclaudian approach is that this constitutive logic of 
articulating the people, the elites, and their characteristics creates political agency 
that facilitates the emergence of historical subjects that can challenge hegemony 
(Mouffe, 2018). Populism can therefore be regarded as a political logic of 
articulation that unifies groups and individuals with various societal demands to form 
imagined alliances or “chains of equivalence” around empty signifiers that 
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eventually constitute “a people” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Laclau, 2005: 69–72, 
161–163, 171). The construction of equivalential chains is therefore at the very core 
of what populism does: using discursive core ideas and symbolic performances to 
transform heterogeneous actors with various unmet demands and grievances into a 
“people”, a unitary subject that can organise itself against the illegitimate existing 
order portrayed by the “elite” (Laclau, 2005; de Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017). 
Laclau’s “populist reason” (2005) refers to the formal constitutive logic or discursive 
mechanism that is inherent in populist articulations: the discursive forming of “a 
people” by creating a discursive boundary of difference between the people and their 
enemies to help organise counterpower against prevailing hegemony. This differs 
from the ideational approach in that, even though the Essex School also regards 
populism as ideas, it is less interested in the ideological contents that populism 
becomes attached to than the process by which those contents, whatever they may 
be, are articulated (de Cleen et al., 2018: 652). 
For the Essex School populism is the process of articulating “collective 
subjectivity” (Palonen, 2018a: 4). Populism is therefore about the discursive drawing 
of boundaries for the purpose of forming political subjects as distinctive points of 
political identification that are essential in the discursive pursuit of hegemony 
(Palonen, 2018a). According to Laclau (2005), political forces create chains of 
equivalence and chains of difference between actors via the discursive linking of 
ideas behind particular signifiers, namely the people and the elites. Therefore, 
populism should be regarded as a means of uniting individuals and groups with 
potentially heterogeneous societal demands as one in a way that highlights the united 
actors’ conflictual relationship with their perceived adversaries (Laclau, 2005: 74). 
Arditi (2010: 489) breaks down this process described by Laclau into six steps. In 
the first step (1), social demands form that cannot be absorbed by or responded to by 
societal institutions. As these demands are unmet, they (2) “enter into a relationship 
of solidarity or equivalence with one another” and (3) “crystallise around common 
symbols” that (4) can be “capitalised by leaders who interpellate the frustrated 
masses and thus begin to incarnate a process of popular identification” that (5) 
constructs “the people” as a collective actor to confront the existing regime with the 
purpose of (6) demanding “regime change”.  
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) suggest that there is nothing inevitable about struggles 
against hegemonic power. Following this idea, it would be inappropriate to claim, 
for example, that the rise of populist radical right parties is a result of increasing 
ethnic and cultural variety in European countries (e.g., Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). 
Instead, individual material phenomena (real or perceived) can be regarded as factors 
contributing to the success of a political mobilisation only after they have become 
discursively attributed to portray hegemonic power as oppressive (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985). Laclau (2005: 200) points out that the emergence of “a people” is 
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therefore not automatic but requires a complex construction process and that this 
process can also fail. It is debatable as to what extent the success of this process is a 
matter of ideological entrepreneurship or the resources available for identity creation 
or just a matter of being at the right place at the right time. But, despite viewing the 
articulation of grievances as the core of populism, also according to Laclau, “some 
degree of crisis in the old structure is a necessary precondition of populism” (Laclau, 
2005: 88, 177). 
Laclau regards political leaders as vital unifying symbols (2005), but charismatic 
leadership is not regarded as inherently necessary to the formation of populist 
movements as people can “project their will” (Laclau, 2005: 158–159) to, for 
example, a leaderless civic movement or any other organisational vehicle with which 
they identify (see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: Chapter 3; Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014). The strength of Laclau’s theory of populism is that it 
doesn’t regard populism as an extant ontology, as the ideational approach does, but 
as the discursive process of uniting unmet social demands to form a chain of 
equivalence. Therefore, the approach manages to highlight that no populist political 
entity can form without the articulation of its populism. The downside to the 
Laclaudian approach is that its theoretical insight on how the articulation of the 
people and its opponents contributes to the forming of populist entities is rather 
vague about the actual contents of populist acts of signification, which makes the 
approach rather difficult to operationalise in empirical research. Also, Laclau’s way 
of using populism as an example of the “royal road to understanding (...) the 
political” (Laclau, 2005: 67) is somewhat ambiguous regarding what constitutes 
populism and what does not (see, e.g., Arditi, 2010; Moffitt, 2016: 22–23). This 
ambiguity is probably one of the reasons why the thin-ideological and 
communication approach scholars have seemed to sidestep Laclaudian theory even 
though it has many similarities to their core ideas. The Essex School’s anti-
essentialist approach to populism suggests that ultimately there is no shared content 
to all populism except for the discursive logic through which the political subjects 
of “us” and “them” are created and which allows hegemony to be challenged. 
Laclau’s theory describes how populism operates as a logic of articulating the 
political, but it tells us little about the discursive strategies or contents of populism, 
and this is where the other approaches come in. Rather than regarding any of these 
approaches as a discrete alternative to the discourse-theoretical approach to 
populism, I suggest they can be regarded to a certain extent as complements to 
Laclaudian theory. 
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2.2 Populism as a set of ideas 
The “ideational approach” is an umbrella term covering different aspects of research 
that regard populism as a set of ideas, boiling populism down to its minimal 
ideational core (Mudde, 2018; Hawkins, 2018). Even though Cas Mudde (2018: 29) 
suggests, somewhat ambiguously, that all research approaches that regard populism 
“as ideas” belong to the ideational approach, here the term “ideational approach” is 
used to describe approaches that regard populism as a thin-centred ideology or as 
extant ideas and attitudes that contain the thin-ideological core of populism. 
According to the most commonly accepted minimal definition by Cas Mudde (2004), 
populism is a thin-centred ideology that considers “society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt 
elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of 
the people” (p. 543). The ideational approach therefore suggests that there is a shared 
substance or content – even if thin – in all types of populism (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2017: 6). This thin-centred ideological core or set of populist ideas is a 
common denominator for all populist actors that represents societal events as a 
struggle between the “will of the people” and corrupt elites. (e.g., Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2018; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). According to Hawkins 
and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), populist ideas are inherently dualistic or Manichean 
as they represent two clearly defined sides of society that are in constant, even 
cosmic (Hawkins, 2018), conflict with each other. 
The thin-ideological (Freeden, 2003) minimal definition of populism succeeds 
in explaining the chameleonic adaptability of populism (Taggart, 2004: 275–276). 
As populism is regarded ideologically only as thin-centred (Mudde, 2004), it requires 
attachment to some thicker ideological contents. This is also why distinguishing 
populist ideas from thicker ideologies is useful: doing so helps explain the various 
sub-types of populism evident in the world (Hawkins, 2018: 69). In different 
contexts, these thin-ideological core elements are attached to more-congruent 
ideological bases, which explains, for example, why populist radical right 
movements tend to be conservative, authoritarian, and nativist (Mudde, 2007: 22–
23) and left-wing populist movements are more often liberal, egalitarian, and reliant 
on some kind of socialism (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; March, 2017; Stavrakakis 
and Katsambekis, 2014). However, the ideational approach is rather strict about what 
kind of actors are regarded as populist: to be clearly labelled populist, a movement 
or party must check all the boxes of populist thin ideology, including anti-pluralism 
(Hawkins, 2018). Whereas, for the Essex School, “the people” and “the elite” can be 
replaced with pretty much any signifier, in the ideational approach “the people” tends 
to refer to average citizens and “the elite” is mostly used to refer to political and 
financial elites (e.g., Hawkins, 2018; Mudde, 2018). This also explains why, for 
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example, the terms centrist or elitist populism (Palonen, 2018b) are somewhat 
oxymoronic for some ideational scholars. 
Unlike the Essex School, the ideational approach expects populism to be 
moralistic, exclusionary, and anti-pluralist. Jan-Werner Müller (2016), for instance, 
presents a polemic understanding of populism that defines it through its illiberal and 
radical right forms. He suggests that populism as a political logic is inherently 
monist, moralistic, and anti-pluralist. In his use of “monism”, he refers to the idea 
that populism regards only “the people” as being worthy of making political 
decisions in society. By the “moralism” of populism, he refers to the moral 
superiority of “the people” over others. And by “anti-pluralism”, he refers to the 
populist tendency to deny the validity of competing political groups as part of, say, 
parliamentary democracy. As such, Müller regards populism as an imminent danger 
to not just liberal democracy but also democracy. Müller’s definition of populism 
has been criticised for its normative outlook, which makes it only applicable to 
analysing mainly far right populism (e.g., Stavrakakis and Jäger, 2017). Most 
ideational scholars are not as prepared as Müller to equate populism with anti-
democratic ideation but instead regard populism as democratic but simultaneously 
illiberal, suggesting that the totality of the people’s will makes populism unavoidably 
anti-pluralist (e.g., Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018: 1670). Exclusion therefore 
is seen essentially as part of the building of “the people” (Butler, 2015), as it is 
impossible to wholly sever the articulation of the “people” from the discursive 
exclusion of the “elite” and its allies (Waisbord, 2018). 
The ideational approach argues that societal events such as the rise of populist 
parties derive from the innate ideological attitudes and characteristics of political 
actors. As this suggests that populism as an ontology can exist without its 
articulation, the approach is not the strongest in explaining how populism manifests 
in action. For example, Kirk Hawkins argues that “behavioural attributes are 
products of the underlying set of ideas” (Hawkins, 2010: 39) and because of that the 
ideational approach “treats populism as a set of ideas that exists in the mind of the 
voters and politicians” (Hawkins, 2018: 62). Therefore, the ideational approach 
treats populist ideas in the abstract and as a given, and, even though the approach 
suggests that the salience of underlying populist ideas can be measured in texts 
(Hawkins and Castanho Silva, 2018), ideational scholars have not been especially 
interested in how populist ideas are created, reproduced, and disseminated to form 
chains of equivalence (e.g., Hawkins, 2018: 66). The ideational approach does 
suggest that there must be a material context of political, cultural, or social failures 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016) that accommodates the “activation” or “mobilisation” 
of populist attitudes (Hawkins, 2018: 62; Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019: 5). 
But regardless, the need for activation or mobilisation of a set of ideas does not 
explain how particular political actors are able to communicate that a crisis or policy 
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failure should be attributed to the elite and how giving sovereignty back to the people 
would solve the situation. 
Therefore, the downside to the ideational (or thin-ideological) approach is that it 
regards populism as a set of exogenous attitudes and ideas already present in the 
minds of citizens and politicians and therefore does not consider the processes 
involved in communicating these attitudes. Instead, it sidesteps the process in which 
the supply and demand of populism meet. Populist attitudes are regarded as 
widespread in the Western world, and a large share of the citizens believe that the 
ordinary people are somehow oppressed and betrayed by some elite (Rooduijn, 2014; 
2018). Even though ideational-approach researchers admit that, on top of the 
material context, the activation of populist attitudes necessitates rhetoric and 
discourses (e.g., Hawkins, 2018: 62), the ideational approach is not very interested 
in how populist ideas are communicated by particular actors. Therefore, it is crucial 
to ask where these “underlying populist ideas” come from and, especially, why 
populist ideas channel themselves via particular movements in the ways they do. 
This is where the approaches to populism as discursive performance, style, and 
communication are useful: they explicate how there cannot be a set of populist core 
ideas without their discursive construction and do so with a greater specificity than 
Laclau. 
2.3 Populism as political performance, style, and 
communication 
Following the Laclaudian idea of populism as articulation, approaches that regard 
populism as performance, style, or communication suggest that it should not be 
viewed as a binary descriptive quality of political actors but as more of a sliding 
scale (de Cleen et al., 2018). As Laclau (2005: 176) suggests, all actors can be 
populist, but some actors are more populist than others. Benjamin Moffitt (2016) 
extends the discursive understanding of populism, defining populism as a political 
style that relies on symbols, aesthetics, and performances that are expressed via the 
(mass) media. Like the ideational approach, Moffitt offers a minimal definition of 
populism. However, his is not based on the thin-ideological content of the message 
but on the manner in which the message is presented. Also, whereas the ideational 
approach focuses on populism as something that is, these approaches suggest that 
populism is something that is done (Moffitt, 2016: 22; 2018b: 3). The approach to 
populism as a style – like the discourse-theoretical approach – suggests that the 
signifiers for the   “people” and “elites” are inherently empty of meaning before they 
are performed and discursively filled up via a political style that includes appeals to 
the people, bad manners, and the performing of crisis and threat (Moffitt, 2016: 45). 
This approach suggests that populism is not an ideology but in some instances also 
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an instrumental or strategic toolkit of sorts that any political actor can use to compete 
in politics (see also Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Barr, 2018). This suggests that populism can 
also be a communicative strategy that frames political discussions as a battle of 
irreconcilable differences between two sides, highlighting populism as discursive 
work rather than a sincere articulation of strongly held beliefs (Waisbord, 2018: 
244). 
Populism as a style asserts that populism can be regarded as a collection of “the 
repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that 
are used to navigate the fields of power that comprise the political” (Moffitt, 2016: 
38). Moffitt thus adds the valuable idea of mediation to Laclau’s theory of populism 
and focuses on the performative, moving away from the purely textual towards 
nonverbal communication (Moffitt, 2016: 39–40; Moffit and Tormey, 2014). 
Moffitt’s idea of populism as a political style binds together “matter and manner, 
message and package” (Pels, 2003: 45), suggesting like Laclau (2005) and Palonen 
(2018a: 4) that there is no content to populism without its performance. Therefore, 
populism as a political style complements the Laclaudian approach. I would also 
argue that the aesthetics and nonverbal elements of populist performance can be 
regarded as discursive acts that have the power to signify, and thus it might not be 
vital to recognise whether the means of constructing the populist superstructure or 
framing is literally “textual”. Nevertheless, populist style has been regarded to 
include unconventional rhetoric that differs from mainstream political speech by 
being colourful, uncivil, emotional, crass, direct, and colloquial (Waisbord, 2018: 
225; Moffitt, 2016: Chapter 3). Populist style also includes “mentioning the 
unmentionable” that is claimed to challenge elites’ interests, being hostile towards 
the media, and questioning established spheres of knowledge (Waisbord, 2018: 244; 
Ylä-Anttila, 2017). Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the populist style is the 
fostering of a belief in the presence of crisis or threat that requires immediate and 
possibly drastic action (Moffitt, 2016: Chapter 7). Crises have been argued to allow 
the maintaining of “populist hype” necessary to make populist claims salient in the 
public sphere (Palonen, 2018a: 4–5; Herkman, 2018). A crisis serves the core 
purpose of simplifying political space by creating a sense of urgency that heightens 
the attribution of blame to various elites that have denied the people their 
sovereignty. Creating a heightened sense of crisis also allows speakers to present 
themselves as a direct means for solving the crisis and thus restoring the people’s 
sovereignty via ousting of the elites (Moffitt, 2016: Chapter 7; Taggart, 2004: 278–
280). 
The latest arrival in populism research is the communication approach to 
populism (Aalberg et al., 2017). Among the first to regard populism explicitly as 
communication were Jagers and Walgrave (2007), who suggest that populism is a 
“communication frame that appeals to and identifies with the people and pretends to 
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speak in their name” (p. 322; see also Aslanidis, 2018). Jagers and Walgrave (2007) 
were also first to suggest that, in populism, the boundary of difference between the 
elites and the people can be communicated differently by focusing on constructing 
the people, on criticizing the elites, or on creating exclusion. Whereas “empty 
populism” is pure people-building and “anti-elitist populism” focuses on criticizing 
and othering the elites, “exclusionary populism” is more focused on defining who 
the people are not. The communication approach combines the ideational approach 
(populism as thin-ideological minimal content) with the political-style approach 
(populism as stylistic performance) and suggests that populist political 
communication consists of the expression of the thin-ideological and stylistic 
components of populism (de Vreese et al., 2018). These components have been 
broken down into analytical tools that can be used to evaluate the salience of populist 
ideas and style in all kinds of texts and performances. However, the approach is still 
less recognised in political science. The salience of populist communication can be 
measured in, for example, textual mediated communication forms such as journalism 
(Wettstein et al., 2018) and online communication (Engesser et al., 2017) and in 
more non-textual instances such as politicians’ appearances on television shows 
(Ernst et al., 2019) or online memes (Schwarzenegger and Wagner, 2018). 
Even though researchers of populist political communication do not explicitly 
say so, their approach can be regarded not only as a convergence of the ideational 
and stylistic approaches but also as an attempt to provide an empirical way to analyse 
the discursive practices related to the discursive articulation processes described by 
Laclau (2005). Until now, the communication approach has created tools for 
empirically analysing the salience of populist thin-ideological and stylistic elements 
appearing in, prevalently, textual communication (Engesser et al., 2017; Wettstein 
et al., 2018) and what effects populist communication has on individuals’ attitudes 
(e.g., Müller et al., 2017). However, if combined with the Laclaudian perspective, 
the communication approach could help us better understand what ends populism 
works towards and what its outcomes are, that is, how the manifestations of populist 
communication contribute to the formation of equivalential chains.   Therefore, a 
theoretical connection between populist political communication and populism as 
articulation must be made. 
From the Laclaudian perspective, the populist logic of articulation leads to a 
historical actor emerging via the construction of a chain of equivalence (Laclau, 
2005). Similarly, the communication approach suggests that populist communication 
connects voters to populist parties or that “populist ideas must be communicated 
discursively to achieve the communicators’ goals and the intended effects on the 
audience” (De Vreese et al., 2018: 425). I suggest that populism both as a logic of 
articulation and as communication is therefore directly related to acts of 
signification. But, whereas populist communication can exist by itself by being 
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encoded into speech acts, the articulation of a populist movement and its 
equivalential chain – in the sense of the emergence of a historical subject – cannot 
be expected to take place solely through the broadcasting and receiving of populist 
ideas and style via mediated populist communication. Therefore, I argue that a 
missing theoretical link exists between the Laclaudian idea of populism as a 
constitutive force that creates historical subjects (Laclau, 2005) and the 
performative-communicative-stylistic aspects of populism (Moffitt, 2016; 
Reinemann et al., 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018). Especially regarding a media system 
where communication is horizontal and can be easily subject to various interventions 
(Chadwick, 2013), we must ask how we get from populist communicators 
disseminating populist messages and performing populist style to the articulation of 
a populist chain of equivalence that can pursue change. I suggest a theoretical 
starting point of regarding the articulation of populist movements to be based not 
only on the contents of populist political communication but also on the discursive 
public interactions pertaining to that communication. This means that, to understand 
how populist political communication affects populist organizational vehicles’ form, 
trajectory, and ability to successfully challenge hegemony, we must look especially 
at how political parties, journalists, and citizens interact with populist political 
communication in the public sphere. 
The main task of the thesis is to provide insight on how the hybridisation of the 
media system affects the articulation of populist chains of equivalence, and this 
necessitates connecting the Laclaudian idea of populism as a logic of articulation to 
the idea of populism as mediated communication. There has been little effort to 
connect Laclau’s theory of populism as a political logic of articulation to the 
emerging theoretical and empirical tools that regard populism as a communication 
phenomenon, probably in part because most of the populist political communication 
researchers have set up camp in the ideational approach. Both the populism-as-style 
and populism-as-communication approaches allow us to assume that the heart of 
populism lies in the ways and practices in which the ideational-stylistic structure of 
populism is discursively created and disseminated. However, there is a slight but 
significant difference here compared to the Laclaudian theory. The conception that 
populist ideas are visible in but not manifested by communication asserts that 
populism as a phenomenon is somehow external to communication. As Reinemann 
et al. (2017) put it, “populism is mostly reflected in the oral, written, and visual 
communication of individuals, politicians, parties, and social movements” (p. 13). 
Laclau’s theory of populism would suggest that populist ideas are not only reflected 
in communication but that they are also made politically alive and relevant via 
communication. I would suggest combining these ideas to argue that the discursive 
articulation of populist chains of equivalence takes place not only via populist 
political communication but also in the interactive process of other actors responding 
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to it. Therefore, a distinction must be made between what populist parties or 
organisations try to communicate and what their communication articulates after the 
communication has gone through a series of discursive negotiations in the public 
sphere. And this is where the role of media as a facilitator, scrutiniser and producer 
of populist communication comes in. 
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3 Media and populism 
Even though the role of journalistic media in increasing the popularity and reach of 
populist actors was addressed already in the early 2000s (Mazzoleni et al., 2003, 
Mudde, 2004: 553–554), the relationship of media and populism has been sparsely 
researched, especially in the political science literature (Moffitt, 2018a: 236). In 
political science, this deficiency is partially explained by the dominance of the 
ideational approach that regards populism as a set of ideas already prevalent among 
the populace (Hawkins and Castanho Silva, 2018). Cas Mudde (2010; 2007: 296–
297) argues that, even though the populist radical right has been regarded as a 
pathology, that is, an alien acute condition gnawing away at the foundations of liberal 
democracy, the thicker ideological contents and attitudes that characterise the 
populist radical right are rather common and “normal” in European societies (see 
also Rooduijn, 2014). Approaching populism from the media and communication 
perspective does not mean that “real-world” structures, events, and attitudes would 
not matter – quite the opposite. One can argue that focusing on mediated 
communication processes in which chains of equivalence are articulated is a 
methodologically sound means of investigating how “real-life events” contribute to 
the support and form of populist parties and movements. The relationship of media 
to populism as a political style and communication provides a way to analyse the 
process in which the populist organizational vehicles connect widespread attitudes 
and grievances as part of their message, emancipating the signifiers that refer to and 
unite their “people”. This is more an important distinction than it may seem: instead 
of interpreting the structural explanations for various grievances to be the underlying 
reason for the form and success of, for example, the populist radical right (e.g., 
Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018), we should focus more on the discursive process 
through which the parties appear as channels for alleviating perceived grievances. 
This is also why media have become an increasingly important factor in populism 
research in the last decade and why, for example, Silvio Waisbord (2018) believes 
that the causes and consequences that populism portrays for democratic politics 
“cannot be properly understood without addressing media and communication 
issues” (p. 201). 
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As the main research question of this study is based on populism as discursive 
articulation, performance, and communication, I regard media as the “central stage 
upon which contemporary populism plays out” (Moffitt, 2016: 14). As Gianpetro 
Mazzoleni (2014) suggests, “the media undeniably appear to be key players in the 
rise and the fall of populist movements” (p. 52). In a sense, one could regard the 
media environment as the engine of populist communication and articulation of 
chains of equivalence: it keeps populist ideas churning and moving by providing 
populist movements with momentum, discursive windows of opportunity, and 
possibilities for developing and disseminating populist ideas (Mazzoleni, 2014: 53). 
Media provide the platform for not only populist political communication but also 
for populist communication becoming challenged and scrutinised, making the media 
environment essential to defining what kind of societal demands populist 
communication ends up articulating. By “media”, I refer to all platforms that allow 
the mediation of ideas and discourse. In most populism research, “the media” refers 
to traditional channels of mass communication, that is, the legacy media or 
professional news organisations previously represented mainly by the print press, 
radio, and television. Therefore, when using “the media”, I am referring to the 
journalistic professional news media. As news organisations are also online, the term 
“online media” does not really distinguish journalistic content or platforms from 
politicians’ or citizens’ online communication taking place on, for example, social 
media. Still, for the sake of readability, I use the term “online media” when 
specifically referring to non-journalistic online media, be it alternative online media, 
a social media platform, or an activist discussion forum. 
3.1 Populism by and through the media 
The relationship of journalistic or legacy media and populism has been studied to a 
certain extent, suggesting that the media themselves can be populist (Krämer, 2014) 
and that the media are complicit in the dissemination of populist messages by 
providing platforms for populist actors (Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014; Krämer, 2017a). 
Esser, Stepinska, and Hopmann (2017: 367–369) describe these two perspectives as 
“populism by and through the media”. The first perspective of “populism by the 
media” is based heavily on Benjamin Krämer’s (2014) idea of media populism. 
According to Krämer, journalistic media can participate independently in the 
creation and upholding of an understanding of a people whose interests are 
irreconcilably different from those of elites that hold power. This phenomenon is 
parallel – and sometimes even contrary – to partisan populism, and it is often related 
to the role of journalism as the watchdog of liberal democracy (Krämer, 2014: 42) 
or to the commercial nature of contemporary media (Mazzoleni, 2008). Media 
populism can be observed, for example, in the ways in which the media appear to 
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speak in defence of the people against the potential and likely wrongdoings of the 
political elites (Plasser and Ulram, 2003), representing itself as “the voice of the 
people” (Krämer, 2014). Also, Moffitt (2016: 74–76) addresses the complicit role of 
the media in the dissemination of populist ideas, asserting that populist style overlaps 
with the logics of commercial media, following Gianpetro Mazzoleni’s (2008) idea 
of the complicity of the logics of populism and commercialised media. 
According to Mazzoleni (2008: 51–52; 2014), the logic of populism aligns well 
with the commercial media logic, which is often characterised via terms such as 
personalisation, spectacularisation, tabloidisation, sensationalism, and attraction to 
conflict-driven and simplified rhetoric. He suggests that because of the 
commercialisation of the media, there is an indirect alliance of complicity between 
media logic and populist logic (Mazzoleni, 2008; 2014). Therefore, Mazzoleni 
asserts that especially tabloid media have been prone to hosting a parallel populist 
style, suggesting that the types of media with more pronounced commercial 
imperatives will contribute more to the allure of populist communication – for 
example, because they are more likely to frame politics through anti-elitist 
confrontation, scandal, and conflict. In quantitative analyses of the salience of media 
populism in different types of journalistic media, the results regarding the supposed 
disproportionate salience of populist statements in the popular press have appeared 
contradictory. Whereas Akkerman (2011) finds that tabloids do not share an anti-
elitist bias alongside populist parties, the extensive content analysis conducted by 
Wettstein et al. (2018) reveals that tabloids do host more populist statements than 
quality media. However, as Benjamin Krämer (2014; 2018) has pointed out, a more 
detailed qualitative difference between different media types can be detected by 
interpretive analyses not based strictly on measuring the salience of people-centrist 
and anti-elitist statements (see, e.g., Herkman, 2017). Also, Hameleers et al. (2017) 
suggest that interpretive journalistic genres such as editorials and columns are 
especially prone to attributing blame to elites. Nevertheless, the consensus among 
researchers remains that mainstream media’s commercial logics, which tend to 
increase the salience of political scandals, crises, and affective framings of politics 
in general, can cultivate the discursive soil for the benefit of populist parties (Moffitt, 
2015; Esser et al., 2017; Ellinas, 2018; Stewart et al., 2003; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019: 
Chapter 5). 
The role of the media in the rise of populism has also been approached from the 
perspective of the media providing a platform on which populist actors perform and 
connect with potential supporters (Mazzoleni, 2014: 47; Moffitt, 2016: Chapter 5). 
Therefore, the perspective of “populism through the media” (Esser et al., 2017: 369) 
focuses on the media as arenas for the dissemination and amplification of populist 
parties’ communication and agendas. Regarding the relationship between the agenda 
of the media and the populists’ electoral success, Ellinas (2018) suggests that 
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populist parties benefit from the legitimacy and momentum provided by media 
coverage regardless of its tone. Boomgaarden and Vliegenhart (2007; 2009) suggest 
that populists benefit when the media discusses topics of which they have ownership 
even if they are not present in the coverage (see also Walgrave and de Swert, 2004). 
However, according to Wettstein et al. (2018), in some European countries where 
effective “cordon sanitaires” have been established around populist parties, these 
parties appear to be underrepresented in the media even in coverage of topics they 
have ownership of (see also Esser et al., 2017: 366). This finding goes somewhat 
against the grain of the often-presented argument that, because of the complicity of 
populist and media logic, all populist political actors would gain disproportionate 
media coverage when compared to non-populists. Especially regarding the United 
States, it has been suggested that, while the conservative media were essential in 
creating a political parallel utilized first by the Tea Party movement and later by 
Donald Trump (Waisbord, 2018: 228; Krämer, 2014), the liberal quality media were 
especially key in the unprecedented salience of the Trump candidacy (Pickard, 
2018). Unsurprisingly, it would also appear that less-successful populist parties tend 
to receive less coverage in the news (Esser et al., 2017). However, as a contrary 
example, the Finns Party gained a disproportionately large share of the mainstream 
media’s attention during electoral competitions even before it became a major 
parliamentary party in 2011 (Niemi, 2013; Railo and Välimäki, 2012b: 124–130). 
There are several reasons why it is extremely difficult for journalists to sidestep 
populist communication, especially populist radical right communication. As Moffitt 
(2016) puts it, “the collision between media logic and political logic finds its most 
pure expression in contemporary populism” (p. 62). For journalism to fulfil its task 
in a liberal democracy, it has been regarded to host a certain ethos and professional 
responsibility to act as the defender of liberal democracy (Krämer, 2018). As 
populist radical right communication is drastically in conflict with journalists’ 
professional values and considerations of civil political discourse, it is nearly 
impossible for journalists to ignore the populist radical right when it breaches those 
values (Wodak, 2013; 2015). Populism’s abrasive stylistic characteristics and anti-
pluralism are also elements that make populist speech newsworthy. Therefore, 
journalistic liberal-democratic sensibilities and commercial practices have been 
regarded to inadvertently bolster the diffusion of populist radical right 
communication in the public sphere (Wodak, 2013; Krämer, 2017a). Some of the 
research on the relationship of populism and the media holds to this argument to the 
extent of being normative: for example, Victor Pickard (2018) directly asserts that 
“commercial imperatives drive news organisations to popularise dangerous politics” 
(p. 195). Thus, in some studies there is an underlying assumption that journalists 
should be somewhat able to prevent the harms of populism. Still, the elite or quality 
media have largely ignored or refused to acknowledge their contribution to the 
Niko Hatakka 
40 
populist radical right’s electoral successes in the Western world. For example, in 
Finland, quality papers’ editorials and columns did not consider that the media had 
boosted the Finns Party’s success before the landslide electoral victory of 2011 
(Hatakka, 2012a; Herkman, 2015). Also, according to Des Freedman (2018), in the 
UK and the US, despite the liberal quality media being aghast at the election of 
Donald Trump and the result of the Brexit referendum, they did not really reflect on 
their role in the outcomes until after the elections (Freedman, 2018: 1–2). 
3.2 The media challenging populism and populism 
challenging the media 
Even though the media often are populist themselves or act as amplifiers for populist 
communication, in qualitative terms, coverage especially of the populist radical right 
tends to be negative in tone (Herkman, 2017; Esser et al. 2017). In some European 
countries, e.g., Belgium (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007) and Sweden (Hellström and 
Nilsson, 2010), journalists have even established cordon sanitaires around populist 
radical right parties, thus denying them an uncritical platform. Especially the elite or 
quality media can be extremely critical in their coverage of populist parties 
(Mazzoleni, 2008; Strömbäck et al., 2017) because of exclusionary populist 
communication’s tendency to breach liberal democratic values of which journalists 
regard themselves guardians (Krämer, 2018). However, such negative coverage does 
not appear to affect the populist parties’ ability to garner support (Esser et al., 2017: 
366), especially if a populist party has gained a reasonable level of legitimacy 
(Herkman, 2017; Stewart et al., 2003), as happened, for example, in Sweden 
(Hellström and Nilsson, 2010) and Finland (Hatakka, 2012b). Nevertheless, 
exclusionary ideational content and politically incorrect stylistic elements make 
populist radical right communication especially prone to being targeted by 
journalistic reporting and continued scrutiny (Article II and III; Herkman, 2018). 
Even though it appears that the critical scrutiny of populist actors may contribute 
to their success, there have been few attempts to theorise why this happens. The most 
common explanation is that negative publicity benefits the populist radical right 
because populism thrives on antagonism and conflict (Mudde, 2007: 252). Gianpetro 
Mazzoleni has suggested that, even though populist parties’ communication attracts 
hostility from the mainstream media, “they can turn this into an opportunity to fuel 
greater visibility by responding in ways that both the hostile and friendly media 
cannot ignore” (Mazzoleni, 2014: 52). As populist-party voters often regard 
journalists as part of the elites, negative publicity can be regarded as proof of political 
weight and legitimacy (Wodak, 2015), which also explains the prevalence of the 
populists’ strategies of using negative coverage for their own communication 
purposes (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 8–11; Pickard, 2016). This practice can 
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include intentional provocation through the use of scandalous but calculated 
ambivalent rhetoric that amasses attention without an unequivocal affiliation with, 
for example, ethnic nationalism or racism (Wodak, 2013; Article II and III). 
According to Benjamin Moffitt (2016), because of the intertwining logics of 
commercial media and populist style, populist politicians can become “quasi-
celebrities, known as much – or sometimes more – for their media performances and 
stylistic outbursts than for the ‘content’ of their politics” (p. 57). Juha Herkman 
(2018) argues that the complicity of moral transgressions by populist politicians and 
the logic of the media is inherent in “neo-populist scandals” that allow populist 
parties to play the underdog and thus benefit from even negative publicity, especially 
in their insurgent stage. Therefore, in the hybrid media system, social media are 
exceptionally important birthing grounds for giving rise to these kinds of populist 
transgressive outbursts, which then are amplified in the mainstream media 
(Herkman, 2018: 351–352; Herkman and Matikainen, 2016; Moffitt, 2018a: 243–
244; Engesser et al., 2017: 1113; Article II and III). 
Ruth Wodak has suggested (2013; 2015) that there is a particular discursive 
mechanism that leads the media to become amplifiers for populist radical right 
communication. Her idea of the “right-wing populist perpetuum mobile” suggests 
that the populist radical right is intentionally baiting the media to cover their 
transgressions of liberal democratic norms and values. The perpetuum mobile 
suggests that populist radical right rhetoric is constructed in a way to create alarm 
among liberal journalists and political opponents, causing it not only to be noticed 
but to be kept on the agenda of discussion for extended periods that usually end with 
a quasi-apology for the originally ambivalent phrasing of the statement that caused 
controversy. According to Wodak, journalists are in a difficult predicament as they 
are professionally inclined to cover controversial statements but at the same time 
they can be aware of providing the populist radical right a visible platform for their 
ideas. Regardless of how strategically calculated the ambivalence is, the 
exclusionary and transgressive discursive elements allow the populist radical right 
to use the media to create extended and highly visible media spectacles via the 
scrutiny of their statements. 
Despite receiving plenty of coverage and arguably having been provided with 
the discursive windows of opportunity needed for the people’s dissatisfaction to be 
channelled towards populist parties, taking an antagonistic approach to the 
mainstream media is a key discursive element in most populist radical right 
movements (Esser et al., 2017: 375–376). Whereas left-wing populism often aims 
its media hostility at “media empires” and ideologically questionable media 
representations, right-wing populism focuses its criticism of the media on the 
ideological alliance between media workers and liberal causes and values (Waisbord, 
2018). When being attacked by the media, right-wing populist actors often repackage 
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their discourse, policies, and rhetorical defence against such attacks using liberal 
tropes and arguments, articulating what Benjamin Moffitt (2017) refers to as 
“illiberal liberalism”. It is also worth noting that populists often refer to the media as 
a single institution portraying the elites’ interests and values (Waisbord, 2018). This 
is evident in the creation of signifiers that condense and transmit the idea of vilified 
and morally bankrupt journalists as lapdogs of the liberal elites, signifiers such as 
“fake news” for Trump (Farkas and Schou, 2018) or “lügenpresse” for Pegida (Holt 
and Haller, 2017) or “eliittimedia” for the Finnish online alternative media (Noppari 
and Hiltunen, 2018; Noppari et al., 2019). Journalists and mainstream news 
organisations are therefore regarded as part of compromised “elite spheres of 
knowledge“ (Ylä-Anttila, 2017), and their motives and political agendas are actively 
and constantly denounced by populist politicians and their supporters. Contrary to 
mainstream media, populist actors praise the achievements of alternative media that 
challenge mainstream sources of news and information (Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Noppari 
and Hiltunen, 2018; Noppari et al., 2019). 
Moffitt (2016: 55) makes the point that the ability to control political 
communication is vital for populists. Populist actors thus appear to oppose all media 
that represent views they dispute. In European populist radical right contexts, this 
kind of anti-media populism has manifested, for example, as a wish to limit public 
broadcasting services that operate under particular sets of values, such as support for 
multiculturalism (Noppari et al., 2019). In countries where authoritarian populists 
have risen to power, they have started to crack down on press freedom. In Venezuela, 
Hugo Chavez restricted press freedom to ensure the “truthfulness” of the opposition 
press (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), and in Hungary free press no longer 
exists (Palonen, 2018a). These attacks on press freedom are in all cases a serious 
undermining of liberal democracy. In Western Europe, though, authoritarian populist 
actors have not gained enough power or resources to restrict the freedom of the press 
via changes in legislation or to own significant parts of the media system (see Silvio 
Berlusconi’s case: Moffitt, 2016: 55–57). 
What are the consequences of the antagonistically tense relationship between the 
mainstream media and populist movements for the institutionalisation of populist 
parties? Overall, the complicity of the media and populism has not been attributed 
to individual media or journalists but to a wider phenomenon in society that has been 
discussed as the mediatisation of politics (Esser and Strömbäck, 2014), which is the 
phenomenon of political actors adjusting their actions to fit “media logic”. Benjamin 
Moffitt (2016: 52–54) has addressed how the complicity of media logic and populist 
political style has become so evident that even non-populist politicians apply 
elements of populist style in their media performances. Especially regarding the 
context of the populist radical right, it has been suggested that mediatisation could 
lead to populist actors trying to appear moderate in the eyes of the wider public, thus 
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making their policies and rhetoric less threatening and leading to a toning down of 
the more extreme exclusionary elements in their communication (Niemi, 2013; 
Mazzoleni, 2014: 52). Adapting to media logic has also been suggested as meaning 
that populist parties have professionalised when it comes to dealing with the media 
– for example, by hiring communication professionals as spin-doctors and 
communication officers (Esser et al., 2017). Still, in many cases, despite hiring 
professionals, populist parties’ communication is intentionally unpolished so as not 
to break the illusion of authenticity and closeness to the people (Moffitt, 2016: 55). 
Overall, it has been suggested that, in the long term, the pressure of the media would 
in fact push populist radical right parties towards the mainstream of politics, leading 
them to abandon their most extreme styles of expressing division between the people 
and elites (Waisbord, 2018: 227). As later explicated in this thesis, public mediated 
pressure and scrutiny indeed have direct effects on the communication processes 
taking place within and around populist movements, but these effects are not likely 
to make populist radical right parties any less radical. 
3.3 Internet-mediated communication and populism 
In the past few years, the unrestricted, cheap, and inclusive access to communication 
provided by social media has become a frequent explanation for the rise of populism. 
Some claim that the rather rapid disruption of the media environment, especially 
regarding the transformation of financially struggling news journalism and the rise 
of social media, would have bolstered populist politicians’ and parties’ claims to 
power (e.g., Crilley and Gillespie, 2019; Schroeder, 2018). The often-heard 
argument is that the major shift towards a horizontal media system combined with 
decreased trust in institutional actors and experts have made citizens more prone to 
accepting populist ideas and to channelling their distrust via populist parties and 
extra-parliamentary movements that communicate and organise via social media 
(e.g., Davies, 2016; Bartlett, 2018). However, this argument has been insufficiently 
researched as “the populist literature is still firmly set in its analysis of old media” 
(Moffitt, 2016: 51). Therefore, even though much has been said about how online 
media contribute to political populism, the topic has been sparsely researched (Esser 
et al. 2017: 376–378). 
The bulk of the academic work on online populism has stressed the role of online 
media in providing a means for circumventing traditional media gatekeepers and thus 
boosting populism via increasing its reach. New online media have been discussed 
as communication platforms, especially for populist leaders, with a focus on the 
characteristics of immediacy and intimacy of online communication being complicit 
with making appeals directly to the people (Moffitt, 2016: 60; 2018a: 240; Ellinas, 
2018). Most empirical studies on populist online action have focused on how and to 
Niko Hatakka 
44 
what extent populist parties and politicians have used online platforms in their 
communication (Esser et al., 2017: 377; Waisbord and Amado, 2017). Populist 
online texts have also been researched from discourse-analytical perspectives by 
focusing on particular discursive elements of populism such as the construction of 
otherness or exclusion (e.g., Sakki and Pettersson, 2015; Horsti, 2016; Pyrhönen, 
2015). It has been hypothesised that online platforms allow populist actors to appeal 
to younger voters especially (Bartlett et al., 2011; Heiss and Matthes, 2017) and that 
they cater to mediating rather mundane frustrations that can be channelled to populist 
parties (Bartlett et al., 2014). It has been also suggested that social media provide 
platforms for homophilic and identity-based communication that suits populist 
movements especially well (Nilsson and Carlsson, 2014). It has also been claimed 
that social media provide platforms for the cultivation of populist ideas and strategies 
(Bartlett et al. 2011; Krämer, 2017b), as they provide cheap, accessible, and efficient 
platforms or “stages” for populist performances (Moffitt, 2018a: 239). Analyses of 
the salience of populist communication across parties and different online media 
have revealed that the extreme left and right use populist communication strategies 
more often than the political centre and that Facebook appears to be more conducive 
to populist political communication than Twitter (Ernst et al., 2017). 
All political actors require access and some degree of control over the flow of 
information in the public sphere, but for the populist radical right, this need is even 
more pronounced as their non-pluralist communicative elements clash with the 
values of media gatekeepers (Krämer, 2018). The key value of the Internet for 
populists has thus been its ability to facilitate radical alternative media for populist 
communication (Atton, 2006). In countries where the mainstream media have been 
especially critical towards populist actors, online platforms have been essential in 
establishing networks of alternative media that allow one to share information, 
negotiate identities, establish relationships and coordinate collective action (Krämer, 
2017b). For example, in Sweden, where the mainstream parties and the media have 
constructed a cordon sanitaire around the Sweden Democrats, there is an active scene 
of multiple populist radical right anti-immigration alternative media (Holt, 2018). In 
Finland, a similar scene exists (Noppari and Hiltunen, 2018; Noppari et al., 2019; 
Ylä-Anttila, 2018). Even though it is worth noting that populist parties have 
circumvented mainstream media before the Internet (Moffitt, 2018a: 238), online 
media provide a direct connection with the people that populist parties claim to 
represent on platforms that provide very minimal content moderation and thus allow 
the use of divisive and politically incorrect language (Atton, 2006; Ben-David and 
Matamoros-Fernandez, 2016). The online populist radical right’s rhetoric regarding 
their own alternative online media is celebratory in tone. These media are often 
described as the tools by which the populist radical right takes back control over 
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“truth” that has been hijacked by the elites (Holt and Haller, 2017; Noppari and 
Hiltunen, 2018; Ylä-Anttila, 2018). 
Despite online media being viewed as a significant factor in the rise of populism, 
few populist parties or movements have used online platforms as their primary mode 
of organisation. Prime examples of so-called techno-populism (Bickerton and 
Invernizzi Accetti, 2018), which attempts to implement populist ideals of direct 
democracy via digital participation platforms, are the Italian 5 Star Movement (Pirro, 
2018) and the Indignados movement that later transformed into Podemos (Gerbaudo, 
2018b). Most populist parties, however, remain in the mode of off-line populist 
communication (Moffitt, 2018a: 236). Despite this, populist leaders and parties tend 
to be comparatively popular on social media platforms when it comes to numbers of 
followers (e.g., Moffitt, 2018a: 239). This is the case in Finland, even though the 
Finns Party candidates have used social media platforms significantly less in political 
campaigning than candidates from other parties (Strandberg, 2012; 2015; Marttila et 
al., 2015: 124). Therefore, as a sounder argument than asserting that populists 
happen to be especially social media savvy, it has been posited that the architecture 
of social media works especially well with the underlying logic of populism 
(Engesser et al., 2017; Gerbaudo, 2018a). 
Paulo Gerbaudo (2018a) suggests that social media has “an elective affinity” 
with populism, be it from the left or the right. His argument is reminiscent of 
Mazzoleni’s media complicity theory (2008) but updated to the digital age, 
suggesting that the architecture and logics of social media contribute to populism 
becoming the most noticeable form of political style. Online platforms have been 
suggested to suit the logic of populist communication well because online 
discussions are often antagonistic due to discussants not being bound to “good 
manners” or political correctness and because common sense is often followed 
online at the expense of expert knowledge being dismissed (Moffitt, 2016: 61). The 
aggregative effects of algorithms have been seen as connecting individuals with 
similar grievances (Gerbaudo, 2018a: 746), and the overall emotional architecture of 
social media (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019: Chapter 7) has been argued to suit the dense 
and scandalizing emotional labour at the core of online populist communication 
(Engesser et al., 2017). Scholars have especially highlighted the drastic contrast 
between the slower deliberative nature of parliamentary politics and the virality, 
divisiveness, and immediacy of online discussion (Kaun, 2015; Moffitt, 2016: 62), 
which can be regarded as making it more attuned to populism. 
Jonathan Bright suggests, through a systematic analysis of Twitter discussions 
over 26 countries, that the farther away political groups are from each other 
ideologically, the less they interact (Bright, 2018). It has been argued that, to a certain 
extent, populist radical right online counterpublics act as “echo chambers” or “self-
protective enclaves” (Hall Jamieson and Cappella, 2010) where minimal interaction 
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with other publics combined with cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias ensure 
that competing frames do not displace populist explanations of the world. According 
to the group polarisation theory suggested by Cass Sunstein (2011), in these kinds of 
environments “where people find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they 
are especially likely to move to extremes” (p. 2). However, the early idea of the 
Internet contributing to the utter balkanisation of the public sphere, where political 
groups are discursively isolated entirely from each other, has been disproved (Dubois 
and Blank, 2018; Pariser, 2015). For example, the significance of purely algorithmic 
news selection in the creation of filter bubbles has been regarded as being rather 
marginal (Bakshy et al., 2015). John Postill (2018) has criticised the idea of a 
particular affinity between populism and social media by noting that non-populists 
are also social media savvy and that social media should not be regarded as a “realm 
apart from the rest of the media environment” (p. 761). Postill’s argument is 
especially valid when one considers how important the role of the so-called “filter 
bubble” effect (Pariser, 2011) has been considered for populism. 
The argument regarding filter bubbles leading to populism suffers from the 
forced narrative of online media facilitating isolated publics that broadcast highly 
specialised ideas into insulated echo chambers in which people accept the presented 
information as a given (Dubois and Blank, 2018; Schroeder, 2018). De Vreese et al. 
(2018: 432) criticise approaching online platforms as a means of direct transmission 
of populist messages from populist leaders to citizens (de Vreese et al., 2018: 432). 
Also, Emiliano Treré (2019: 2) has characterised the mainstream approach of 
regarding online media as being instrumental for the formation of populist political 
action as “communicative reductionism”. Especially after the Brexit referendum and 
the election of Donald Trump, journalistic analyses have assigned disproportionate 
responsibility to social media over the global rise of populism, even birthing entire 
meta-discussions about post-factuality and post-truth (e.g., Davies, 2016). 
Traditional media and academia went into a frenzy around the idea of social media 
creating a “post-truth” or “post-factual” world in which new information and 
communication technologies are being used to circumvent the rational deliberation 
on which democratic decision-making is based (Vaidhyanathan, 2018; Farkas and 
Schou, 2019). This interpretation can be regarded partially as backlash to the 
celebratory interpretations of social media’s emancipatory powers that were 
prevalent during the Obama campaign and the Arab Spring (e.g., Castells, 2012). 
But even in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal (Simon, 2018), it is 
worth noting that, alongside fake news, computational propaganda, and targeted 
political marketing, “there is the everyday online production and circulation of 
information that is exaggerated, sensationalised, selective, or assembled from a web 
of partial truths in hybrid networks and less reputable sources” (Chadwick et al., 
2018: 4). Instead of assuming online platforms are isolated informational 
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ecosystems, de Vreese et al. (2018) assert we should look at them “as part of a larger 
information system” (p. 432). Therefore, I view the frameworks provided by the 
discussions regarding “fake news” (Farkas and Schou, 2018), “post-factual” and “the 
age of post-truth politics” (Davies, 2016) – regardless of how interesting the 
discussions are – as being not especially useful in analysing populism as a logic of 
articulation in the hybrid media system, not least because these frameworks contain 
the strong normative position of regarding (online) populism as being inherently 
harmful. 
Previous studies on the relationship of digital communication technologies and 
populism have been vital in revealing that populist parties use online media to 
connect with their constituencies and that there is a noteworthy affinity between the 
architecture of social media platforms and the antagonistic elements of populist 
communication. Social media are emancipatory for populist actors, but our 
understanding of the relationship of media and populism has yet to be updated to 
accommodate the idea of online media as an integral part of the wider media 
environment. So far, there has been plenty of research on what populists do online, 
but there is little research on what does the online do to populism. One of the better 
attempts at such research was that of Benjamin Krämer (2017b), who suggests that 
social media platforms allow (right-wing) populists to hone their discursive practices 
in a way that makes their populism ideologically thicker. Still, we lack research 
efforts to describe how the hybridisation of the media system and the rise of Internet-
mediated communication affects the discursive articulation process of populism and 
how this influences the mainstreaming and normalisation of populist movements. 
There has been little research on how other actors and publics interact with online 
populist communication; for example, we know little about the role of online publics 
in challenging populist communication. Therefore, future studies must consider the 
role of people, not only as consumers but as producers and interpreters of populist 
content (Moffitt, 2016: 61), and that online media are not autonomous from but part 
of the media system (e.g., Herkman and Matikainen, 2016). This requires us to 
analyse populist logic in the context of the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). 
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4 Analysing populism in the hybrid 
media system 
The premise of this doctoral thesis is to analyse populism as discursive signification 
practice taking place in a living-and-breathing hybrid media system where various 
actors with differing motivations participate in producing and interacting with 
populist messages. Online environments are particularly interesting in the context of 
populism as discourse, style, and communication because they allow more than just 
political and journalistic elites to get involved in the discursive labour that eventually 
articulates populist chains of equivalence – for better or for worse. I argue that 
populist online communication is not a matter of the mere transmission and adoption 
of messages but a process of discursive negotiation through series of actions and 
counter-actions, which in turn can be hypothesised to affect how populist movement 
supporters and opponents evaluate the societal worth of populist parties or 
movements. Therefore, the process in which various actors interact with populist 
communication can affect not only how populism is communicated but more 
interestingly what populist political communication ends up articulating. We know 
little about the discursive interactions between populist online communicators and 
other actors active in the media system, but we know even less about how these 
interactions affect the form of populist mobilisations. The literature discusses the 
relationship of populism and media mostly in the context of the traditional 
journalistic media with a single “media logic” (Mazzoleni, 2008; 2014; Esser et al., 
2017). To analyse how populist communication taking place in online 
counterpublics interacts with party politics, journalism, and activism, several 
theoretical issues regarding the multiple logics of contemporary media systems must 
first be clarified. 
4.1 Hybridity of media systems 
Until about the 2000s, the media system was thought to comprise the print press, 
considered to be the main information producer; television, viewed as the main 
means of diffusing information to large audiences; and radio, which provided a 
means of direct interaction with audiences (Bennett, 1990; Castells, 2007: 240). The 
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central theories on the role of media in democratic politics formed around the 
assumption “about inclusive and relatively well-functioning public spheres in which 
communication from legitimate institutions passes through press organisations to 
affect the opinions and actions of citizens” (Bennett and Pfetsch, 2018: 243). 
According to Bennett and Pfetsch (2018), this underlying assumption regarding the 
media system has started to lose its explanatory value in the so-called fourth age of 
political communication, where sources, communicators, locales, and moments of 
reception are abundant and where the core relationships between the main actors 
taking part in political communication have been reconfigured (Blumler and 
Coleman, 2015: 111). Social media have become an inherent part of the political 
public sphere by integrating citizen- and politician-controlled online media with 
traditional spaces for news production, dissemination, and commentary (Chadwick, 
2013). 
One of the main theories concerning contemporary politics and media in the 21st 
century has been Andrew Chadwick’s (2013; 2017) hybrid media system. Its key 
characteristic is that, in the hybrid media system, the spread of information takes 
place in multiple publics at multiple times and is done by multiple actors with 
multiple voices (see also Hepp and Couldry, 2010: 9). The hybrid media system 
provides actors with voices and a means of producing, circulating, and reframing 
information of their own and therefore has been described as reconfiguring the flow 
of politically relevant information in society (Chadwick, 2011; 2013). Chadwick’s 
idea of the hybrid media system presents a holistic understanding of media. Instead 
of just focusing on, for example, how online technology is being used in political 
campaigning, Chadwick suggests that we focus on the everyday politico-cultural 
practices in which technology is embedded. Therefore, the study of politics in the 
hybrid media system is the study of how the various logics and actors of politics and 
media interact with each other regardless of their character or platform of mediation. 
Chadwick suggests that, in the hybrid media system, power is fragmented, 
relational, plural, and dispersed, and therefore hybridity has brought chaos and 
nonlinearity to political communication (Chadwick, 2013: 210). The Internet and the 
birth of a web culture based on social interaction have opened the way for parallel 
public spheres that are partially independent of the traditional gatekeepers of the 
professional news media. These online publics have become an inherent part of the 
political public sphere by integrating citizen- and politician-controlled online action 
with traditional journalistic production and dissemination of news. Chadwick 
suggests that, in this kind of a hybrid media system, the traditional political news 
cycle has transformed into the so-called political information cycle in which the non-
elites have greater ability to participate and intervene in the mediation of societal 
events via digital communication technologies. Social media such as Facebook and 
Twitter enable activists, citizens, and fringe politicians to get more involved in the 
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mediation and ideological articulation of different policy options within their own 
political communities. Chadwick is optimistic about the consequences of the media 
system’s hybridisation for democracy due to the fact that a more horizontal media 
system can be “more expansive and inclusive than those that prevailed during the 
twentieth century” (Chadwick, 2013: 210; see also Jenkins, 2006: 240–260). But we 
are still rather unaware of how this expansive inclusiveness and horizontality affects 
populism as a political logic of articulation. That is, what does it mean for the 
articulation of “the people” when anyone can speak for or be interpreted as speaking 
for “the people”? Andrew Chadwick defines the hybrid media system as follows: 
“The hybrid media system is built upon interactions among older and newer 
media logics – where logics are defined as technologies, genres, norms, 
behaviours, and organisational forms – in the reflexively connected fields of 
media and politics. Actors in this system are articulated by complex and ever-
evolving relationships based upon adaptation and interdependence and 
simultaneous concentrations and diffusions of power. Actors create, tap, or steer 
information flows in ways that suit their goals and in ways that modify, enable, 
or disable others’ agency, across and between a range of older and newer media 
settings. (…) Hybrid thinking thus provides a useful disposition for studying 
how political actors, publics, and media of all kinds interact.” (Chadwick, 2013: 
5) 
The hybrid media system – as an idea – focuses on the integration of online 
communication with traditional media and on the discursive interconnection 
between multiple actors involved in the communicational system. Attempts to 
explain how populism operates in the current media environment must go beyond 
the characteristics of populist online movements or populist online rhetoric and the 
ideological or stylistic contents of populist communication. Following Chadwick 
(2013), what matters in the hybrid media system is the mediated interconnectedness 
of different actors’ public actions participating in or reacting to populist 
communication. Therefore, when looking at how the media system’s hybridisation 
contributes to populist logic, we should look at how populist communication is being 
produced, circulated, and reacted to, not only in online publics but also in the wider 
media system where politicians, journalists, and activists interact with populist 
communication. 
Most literature on populist online communication has stressed that online 
platforms have provided populist movements with independence from traditional 
gatekeepers, from traditional norms for acceptable speech, and even from the 
restrictions of “truth” (Bergmann, 2018; Schroeder, 2018). John Postill (2018) points 
out that communication taking place via social media does not take place in isolation, 
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as social and mainstream media “feed off one another in recursive loops of ‘viral 
reality’” (p. 756; see also Postill, 2014). Also, in Chadwick’s hybrid media system, 
it is not independence but interdependence that creates the most interesting political 
media phenomena in the 21st century: the ability to interact and intervene make 
instability and conflict inherent in the hybrid media system. Therefore, research is 
emerging that is interested especially in the implications of the dynamic mediated 
interrelations between media platforms, actors, and practices (Treré 2018, 145). The 
study of populist online communication thus should be the study not only of action 
but also of reflexive reaction. The notion of interdependence informs us that, to 
answer the question of how online platforms affect populist parties’ efforts to 
construct chains of equivalence, analysing the contents of populist communication 
does not suffice – we have to look at the “recursive loops” (Postill, 2018) of how 
actors interact with populist communication in the hybrid media system. 
The idea of the hybrid media system challenges Altheide and Snow’s classic idea 
of “media logic”, which posits that there is a single dominant logic to mass media 
that influences how politics become public (Altheide and Snow, 1979). Altheide and 
Snow (1979) suggest that “social reality is constituted, recognised, and celebrated 
with media” (p. 12) and that the logic of the media will also affect how politics 
operate, resulting in an increased media dependence in politics. Now new digital 
information and communication technologies are changing the basic theoretical 
assumptions about the importance of traditional mass media as the main source of 
political information. This change has made obsolete the assumption of an 
underlying unitary media logic as the main force to which political actors must adapt 
their actions. It has been suggested that, instead of a single logic, the newer media 
system has several intertwining logics (Chadwick et al., 2016; van Dijk and Poell, 
2013; Mazzoleni, 2017). The hybrid media system suggests that multiple logics are 
at play, as media logics comprise “bundles of technologies, genres, norms, 
behaviours, and organisational forms” (Chadwick et al., 2016: 8). Chadwick 
suggests we should direct our focus at “the liminal, in-betweenness, and flux”, 
referring to media logic as something co-created by different political actors, media, 
and publics (Chadwick, 2013). Therefore, when looking at the relationship of 
populism and media, we should direct our gaze at how the interrelations of different 
actors in the media system contribute to how populism plays out. As Jay Blumler 
(2015) aptly describes it, “the traffic between media and politics does not run along 
a one-way street but comprises instead a multiplicity of reciprocal interactions with 
varying consequences” (p. 430).  
The theories of the hybrid media system and populism as a political logic of 
articulation have rarely been connected in research. John Postill (2018) has theorised 
that, in the hybrid media system, “populists never operate in a vacuum, or indeed a 
filter bubble” (p. 762). Instead he claims that populists share mediated space with 
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other actors and that over time these actors will become fully aware of one another 
and develop media strategies to accommodate the situation. Also, Benjamin Moffitt 
mentions the “increasing hybridity” of populism, referring to how populist actors are 
communicating across older and newer media (Moffitt, 2018a: 244–245; see also 
Vaccari et al., 2015). The notion of hybridity in which people can join in the 
articulation of the political has been used in research mostly to convey the idea that 
online environments have given populist actors broader chances to communicate 
their message (Moffitt, 2018a). But this does not go far enough, that is, it does not 
explain how the media system’s hybridisation has affected the discursive process in 
which populist chains of equivalence are created, how populist claims form, what 
kind of conflicts they cause, or how these conflicts are negotiated. To investigate 
these questions, we must analyse the mediated interactions between the different 
actors involved in producing, disseminating, and criticizing populist political 
communication. 
4.2 Online platforms facilitating populist 
counterpublics 
The discourse theory of the Essex School suggests that meaning is formed 
through discursive articulation, referring to the process of signification in which 
ideas are placed in relation to each other via language and social interaction. 
Discourses are constantly negotiated systems of fixed meanings attached to things 
via language and social interaction, and at the core of politics is the constant 
discursive battle over which systems of meaning enjoy hegemony over others 
(Laclau, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The public sphere therefore has the 
important task of organising a forum for this process to take place. As an ideal, the 
public sphere should facilitate inclusive and rational deliberation on the optimal 
political solutions acceptable to all parties (Habermas, 1989). Yet, a public sphere 
based on fully rational, inclusive, and functional deliberation has been criticised as 
utopian (Fraser, 1990; Geuss, 2019). Chantal Mouffe’s (2013) idea of agonism 
suggests that the public sphere should be regarded as a stage on which political 
actors, journalists, and citizens engage in a conflictual but respectful symbolic 
rhetorical struggle for acceptance of their preferred definitions of the topics of 
discussion. The ones who get their definitions accepted wield more power over those 
pushed to the side-lines. This symbolic struggle for hegemony is entirely a discursive 
process, which the cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1982) calls the “politics of 
signification”. The discursive struggle for hegemony via the politics of signification 
is the process in which the political emerges (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), and today 
the process of formulating and challenging hegemonic discourses takes place in 
mediated form (Dahlgren, 2013: 19). 
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Online political communication – as an act of individualised effort seeking to 
influence decision-making processes – is strongly connected to the politics of 
signification, the historically changing series of acts giving meaning to societal 
phenomena (Hall, 1982). Today, this struggle for how political issues should be 
viewed takes place mostly in the mediated public sphere. In societies in which 
politics are mostly mediated, the ways in which politics are understood depend 
heavily on which issues are salient, how issues are framed, and how their 
representations receive their meanings. As Peter Dahlgren (2013) puts it, “Discourse 
theory is engaged in exploring the conditions that make specific identities, meanings, 
and practices possible, and how the dynamics of power support or alter them. Public 
spheres become not just sites of political communication, but rather the spaces that 
discursively construct specific political subjectivities” (p. 71). As media have an 
ability to provide mental guidelines for understanding the world beyond our physical 
realm, the mediated portrayal of politics affects how people experience political 
realities (Dahlgren, 2013; Mouffe, 2013: 143–144). 
The study of populism as a political logic of articulation is concerned with the 
production and exchange of meanings and significations within political discussion. 
The power to signify – to give meaning to things – is not a force free of ideology. 
According to Dahlgren (2013), “Discourses can serve to help engender and sustain 
social order – as well as to challenge it – by solidifying patterns of meaning. Thus, 
discourses are more than just text or performance; they are ‘manifestations of 
(collective) social practice’” (p. 173). Signification affects perceptions of conflicting 
social issues and therefore affects their outcomes, as it is the means through which 
social understandings form – and therefore signification is also the means of 
mobilising support for political causes or organisations. In Laclau’s theory of 
populism as discursive articulation (2005), the construction of chains of equivalence 
facilitates the building of the political momentum necessary to enable counter-
hegemony. Populist online communication can be regarded as part of the counter-
hegemonic signification struggle over how societal situations are viewed. Therefore, 
people participating in online counterpublics can be regarded as agents of 
signification (Snow, 2004) who contest hegemonic understandings of social reality. 
And thus, online platforms can serve as counter-hegemonic spaces where people can 
get involved in communicating marginalised, for example populist radical right, 
understandings of society and its members’ relationships. These kinds of publics 
have been discussed in the literature as counterpublics (Downey and Fenton, 2003; 
Fenton and Downey, 2003; Fraser, 1990; Warner, 2002). 
Counterpublics are “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated 
publics invent and circulate counterdiscourses, so as to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (Fraser, 1990: 67). 
Theoretically, counterpublics have been seen to coexist with mainstream publics that 
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do not grant “subaltern” or “marginalised” groups access to the public symbolic 
contestation and forging of solidarities that could lead to challenging the hegemony 
(Fraser, 1990; Nikunen, 2019). Counterpublics have been regarded as important for 
allowing the “recognition of the public struggles and political innovations of 
marginalised groups outside traditional or state-sanctioned public spaces and 
mainstream discourses” (Squires, 2002). Counterpublic research has focused heavily 
on spaces for progressive political struggle (Fraser, 1990; Squires, 2002: 446), but 
counterpublics are ambivalent in their contents (Alvarez and Dahlgren, 2016). 
Regardless of what kinds of solidarities and contestations they facilitate, 
counterpublics are thought to “expand discursive space” (Fraser, 1990: 67, 76–77). 
Counterpublics offer platforms for communication that challenges societal power 
relations (Warner, 2002) as they “offer space for critique for the dominant order and 
action to transform that order” (Squires, 2002: 447). Therefore, counterpublics are 
crucial for criticizing hegemonic discourses and for forming collective identities 
without the imminent threat of being silenced or compromised (Fraser, 1990; 
Squires, 2002: 450). 
In the contemporary media environment, online platforms play an important role 
in the forming of counterpublics. From the early 2000s onwards, the Internet has 
been regarded as facilitating issue-specific collective action, lowering thresholds for 
political participation, and affecting how political movements organise (Castells, 
2007; Coleman, 2017). Some have suggested that political movements organising 
via social media have been able to raise social and political issues and motivate 
people to call for political alternatives (e.g., Mouffe, 2013; Gerbaudo, 2012). The 
online voicing of previously unmet political grievances has been regarded as 
enabling a new consciousness that creates incentives and momentum for political 
change that previously may not have found any institutional channels (Mouffe, 
2013). These communities or movements often have liquid forms of leadership 
(Gerbaudo, 2012), and their participants contribute from their individualised 
perspective to building a collective identity within the public (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2013). Like counterpublics in general, online movements have been 
researched, especially in the context of left-wing or otherwise progressive and 
radical democratic movements (Juris, 2008; Gerbaudo, 2012; Castells, 2012; Fenton, 
2016; Nikunen, 2019). But in this thesis, various online platforms, social media, and 
online alternative media are regarded as facilitating counterpublics for populist 
radical right communication. By referring to populist online counterpublics, I am not 
asserting that the architecture of online platforms is inherently populist (e.g., 
Gerbaudo, 2018a) but that online platforms can be used to facilitate subaltern public 
spaces for populist political communication. 
Counterpublic theory has recognised that counterpublics are rarely homogenous 
and, that when discussing them, we should be thinking of several overlapping publics 
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instead of a singular one (Warner, 2002). According to Rita Felski (1989), who 
worked on feminist movements, counterpublics are formed of “coalitions of 
overlapping sub-communities, which share common interest in combating (…) 
oppression but which are differentiated (…) often by institutional locations” (Felski 
1989: 171). Also online populist radical right counterpublics are characterised by 
their many forms and locations, as populist counterdiscourses can be fostered in a 
wide range of locales, including populist politicians’ blogs, Facebook pages, news 
comments sections, alternative news platforms, Twitter networks, YouTube 
channels, and discussion platforms. Participation in online counterpublics can range 
from low-key mundane discussions to direct political campaign practices or from the 
“pre-political” to “para-political” to “full blown political”, and therefore online 
participation often has only remote links to institutional decision-making processes 
(Dahlgren, 2013: 18–19). According to Dahlgren (2013: 20), political participation 
in online counterpublics is thus very much subjective, and its affective intensity can 
range from mild to extremely emotional. In the same sense in which various online 
spaces overlap to form counterpublics, the various populist signification practices 
taking place in these locations overlap to contribute to the articulation of populist 
chains of equivalence.  
4.3 Connectivity and materiality of online action 
Researchers have suggested that online platforms not only facilitate political 
counterpublics but actively shape the form and mechanics of political action (Poell 
and van Dijk, 2018; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Milan, 2015a). According to 
Manuel Castells (2012: 225), digital networks can transform how activism plays out 
by facilitating leaderless cooperation and solidarity between individuals who do not 
necessarily share common goals and motives for participating. Lance Bennett and 
Alexandra Segerberg (2013) have gone even further to suggest that online platforms 
facilitate what they refer to as connective, instead of collective, action. According to 
their theory of connective action, the affordances of social media allow people to 
work together to produce action frames without any pre-existing connection or 
notion of solidarity. This can occur because connective action networks rely on the 
self-motivated sharing of personalised ideas, images, and resources (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2012: 752–753). In connective logic, individuals can contribute 
horizontally as autonomous agents to the discursive construction of political subjects 
(Fenton, 2016: 106), be they protest movements (Dahlgren, 2013: Chapter 3) or 
political parties (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016). For populism as a logic 
articulation, the decentralised and horizontal nature of online communication 
(Fenton, 2016) means that the discursive labour carried out in online counterpublics 
will most likely affect the process in which societal demands are articulated into a 
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chain of equivalence (Laclau, 2005). And, as this thesis shows, the multitude of 
autonomous communicators articulating party identity is a boon and a burden for 
party organisations. 
Online counterpublics hosting a multitude of individuals communicating the 
thin-ideological core of populism can be an invaluable resource for party 
organizations trying to connect the supply and demand for populism at a historical 
moment. There are certain characteristics of online communication that have been 
regarded as being especially beneficial for online platforms in facilitating radical 
politics. Natalie Fenton (2016) suggests that the Internet allows activists to respond 
rapidly to events as they unfold with minimal bureaucracy and resources (pp. 26–
28) and that online action’s connective elements make it possible for them to voice 
concerns and societal demands that otherwise might never be heard (p. 25). 
Chadwick and Stromer-Galley (2016) suggest that digital media enables political 
parties to “renew from the outside in” by allowing activists to breathe new life into 
the old form of party politics (pp. 286–290). Many of the activists taking part in 
online counterpublics have been observed to portray a sort of “dual identification” 
(Heaney and Rojas, 2015) in which individuals regard themselves simultaneously as 
movement activists and party activists. Vaccari and Valeriani (2016: 295) suggest 
that online publics can deepen and broaden party-related engagement by providing 
new channels for party members to provide feedback, resources, and support and by 
enabling involvement for individuals who are not party members. Online 
counterpublics therefore complement professionalised political communication with 
grassroots citizen-initiated campaigning that is based on a loose, informal supporter 
network structure (Gibson, 2015: 191–192). 
Connective political participation in online counterpublics can produce a wealth 
of discursive artefacts to be circulated and used for political campaigning both in 
online and legacy media as “activists simplify complex narratives of injustice into 
sound bites, images, and memes” (Treré, 2018: 147). This is highly relevant for 
online publics acting as agenda-setters as it has been suggested that online 
communication often spills over to mainstream media, increasing its societal effect 
many times over (Pfetsch et al., 2013; Zhou and Moy, 2007). For example, this spill-
over, which results in the amplification of online discourses, can happen when 
journalists select pieces of online communication in their coverage or when 
politicians adopt arguments and frames from online discussions (Pfetsch et al., 2013: 
12). Pfetsch, Silke and Bennett (2013) suggest that online counterpublics are 
especially likely to trigger spill-over into other parts of the public sphere if they have 
developed “strong issues and dominant frames in the online world” (p. 12). They 
propose that the strength and dominance of a frame is related to 1) the fact that the 
online coalition involves actors who are strongly connected and strongly prioritise a 
particular issue on their agenda, 2) that the coalition has a master frame that connects 
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the involved groups, and 3) that there are prominent frame sponsors to accelerate the 
spill-over (Pfetsch et al., 2013: 14). 
As this thesis reveals, the spill-over of communication from online 
counterpublics to the mainstream media can be problematic for party organisations, 
as individuals’ understanding of appropriate means for expressing the divide 
between the people and the elites might not be in line with what is regarded as 
acceptable for a parliamentary party in a liberal democracy. While populist radical 
right communication is especially prone to clashing with the values of liberal 
democracy (Krämer, 2018), it is also susceptible to being targeted with surveillance 
and scrutiny as, according to Eric Carlsson (2014), “in the realm of social networking 
media (…) the whole point of this form of communication is to watch and to be 
watched” (p. 43). The online actions of various populist radical right actors can 
therefore be regarded as taking place in a “digital enclosure” (Andrejevic, 2007: 212) 
of social media platforms on which data and information about individuals and 
groups interested in populist radical right populist parties or candidates’ agendas are 
being constantly accumulated, archived, and surveilled. Stefania Milan has asserted 
that, because of the materiality and visibility of online political communication, 
online political action will inescapably become affected with what she calls the 
“politics of visibility” (Milan, 2015a). According to Milan, the politics of visibility 
has three consequences related to surveillance. First, it makes an online movement 
transparent to its opponents, making it easier for it to be targeted for scrutiny. 
Second, the politics of visibility causes self-surveillance as movement actors will 
react to external and internal communication that is discordant with the movement’s 
core ideas, which can lead to conflict (see also Dahlgren, 2013: 28; Treré, 2015). 
But, third, public scrutiny and surveillance can also be turned into discursive 
opportunities for activism as the ones being targeted with surveillance can turn to 
inverse surveillance tactics (Milan, 2015a; 2015b). 
Populism as a logic of articulation creates unity between groups and individuals 
who previously might not have had anything in common through the discursive 
construction of an imaginary of a people and its antagonism with elites (Laclau, 
2005). As explained above and further elaborated later, the logics of online platforms 
as counterpublics can be argued to support the discursive placing of unmet societal 
demands into a populist chain of equivalence, but at the same time the same logics 
can prove to be challenging for the political party acting as the organisational vehicle 
of the equivalential chain. In the Laclaudian sense, unless they are identified as a 
channel for opposing the prevailing hegemony, populist parties in representative 
democracies cannot become channels for institutionalising any unmet societal 
demands. But at the same time, if their core message becomes widely perceived in 
public discussion as unacceptable, their chances of obtaining power to 
institutionalise those demands are likewise weakened. Therefore, investigating 
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discursive interactions pertaining to online populist communication between 
activists, politicians, and journalists is essential to understanding how the hybrid 
media system affects populist movements’ viability as channels for political change. 
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5 Methodological approach 
5.1 Qualitative multi-actor and multi-platform 
analysis of discursive interactions pertaining to 
populist political communication 
The research question of this thesis – how does the hybridization of the media system 
affect populism as a political logic of articulation? – is operationalised through a 
cross-disciplinary post-structural discourse-theoretical approach. Populism in the 
hybrid media system is thus analysed from the perspective of meaning-making as 
discursive articulation (Laclau, 2005). This approach is essentially influenced by 
post-Marxist discourse theory, which suggests that the formation of “the political” is 
articulated via discourse instead of economic or structural factors being the prime 
historical determiners of identities and their transformations (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985). Articulation here is understood, from the Laclaudian perspective, to be the 
struggle to fix meaning and define reality in “the politics of signification” (Hall, 
1982), that is, the process through which the meaning of things is negotiated in 
society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105; Laclau, 2005: 68), a process that takes place 
today largely via media (Dahlgren, 2013: 19; Esser and Strömbäck, 2014). 
Therefore, populism as discursive articulation is regarded as a formal constitutive 
logic through which meaning is negotiated in a manner that allows political actors to 
represent “a people”, that is, a heterogeneous alliance of actors with grievances and 
unmet societal demands unified in a chain of equivalence (Laclau, 2005). 
As a methodological innovation, this approach connects the Laclaudian idea of 
populism as a logic of discursive articulation to theory that regard populism as 
communication (Esser et al., 2017; de Vreese et al., 2018) which suggests that 
populism can be observed in acts of signification that contain the thin-ideological or 
ideational (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Hawkins, 2018) and stylistic 
elements of populism (Moffitt, 2016). As a departure from previous studies that have 
viewed populism as a communication phenomenon, the study’s objective is not to 
examine the contents of populist communication or its salience in mediated political 
discussion. Instead, the goal is to describe how the hybridity of the media 
environment in which the politics of signification take place affects how populism 
as a formal logic of discursive articulation operates and plays out (see also Palonen 
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and Saresma, 2017: 33). Populism provides the discursive glue that connects societal 
demands and resentments around a signifier such as a political party or a movement 
that provides a shared point of identification for the collective effort to rectify these 
resentments against the wishes of an undeserved elite (Laclau, 2005). For a party or 
movement to be regarded as the “organisational vehicle” (Hawkins, 2018: 63) or 
carrier for a populist chain of equivalence, it needs to connect unmet societal 
demands and resentments to the movement, and this pursuit is what makes populism 
inherently steeped in communication (de Vreese et al., 2018: 427–428; Reinemann 
et al., 2017:16–19). 
I argue that populist communication taking place in various online 
counterpublics has become part of the discursive process in which populist chains of 
equivalence are formed, diffused, and maintained in contemporary media systems 
(e.g., Krämer, 2017a; 2017b). As the hybrid media system provides chances for 
various kinds of interventions to communication (Chadwick, 2013), it also opens 
online populist political communication to intervention by other actors. Therefore, I 
suggest that it is not only populist communication that articulates populist chains of 
equivalence but also the ways in which different publics interact in producing and 
reacting to populist communication. More than just asking how online platforms are 
used to communicate populist ideas and style, this study asks how online populist 
communication is being interacted with by other actors in the hybrid media system 
and how this affects for the articulation of populist movements’ chains of 
equivalence. This doctoral thesis analyses the role of the media system’s 
hybridisation in the discursive articulation of the Finns Party as an “organisational 
vehicle” for populist mobilisation (Hawkins, 2018: 63). In the study, the Finns Party 
is regarded as the main carrier for an equivalential chain in which different unmet 
political demands are joined via discursive interaction processes taking place on 
various platforms provided by the hybrid media system. The aim is therefore to 
analyse how the democratisation of communication due to the rise of the Internet 
and social media has affected the discursive process in which the Finns Party became 
the institutional channel for the most successful and influential populist mobilisation 
in Finland, leading the party all the way in and out of government in the 2010s. 
I argue that, for one to analyse successfully the articulation process of populist 
signifiers in the hybrid media system, the focus of the analysis must be shifted from 
populist political communication itself to the nature of the interactions with populist 
communication in the public sphere and how this reciprocally feeds back into 
populist communication. Therefore, I suggest that we update our understanding of 
the relationship of media and populism to include the idea of hybrid interactivity into 
heuristic models of how populist political communication is diffused in the public 
sphere. The model suggested by Esser et al. (2017; see also Reinemann et al., 2017: 
22) presents populism by and through the journalistic media, but it largely sidesteps 
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the role of Internet-mediated communication and does not adequately consider 
reciprocal interactivity, which I claim is relevant to explaining how populist logic 
ends up articulating populist movements in the contemporary media environment. I 
suggest that the most pertinent permutations for analysing the diffusion of and 
interactions pertaining to populist political communication in the hybrid media 
system are as follows:  
1)  Media populism: Mainstream media communicating populist ideas and 
style independently of political actors (e.g., Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 
2008; Esser et al., 2017). 
2)  Populist communication circumventing gatekeepers: Populists 
communicating populist ideas and style independently of the mainstream 
media (e.g., Krämer; 2017b; Schroeder, 2018; Moffitt, 2016: 59–62). 
3)  Populist remediation of media content: Media content remediated by 
populists to communicate populist ideas and style (Article I). 
4)  Journalistic amplification of populist communication: Mainstream media 
covering populist communication and simultaneously participating in its 
dissemination (Esser et al., 2017;Wodak, 2015; Krämer, 2017a; Articles 
II and III). 
5)  Civic amplification of populist communication: Political opponents and 
activists discussing populist communication and simultaneously 
disseminating it via online and mainstream media (Article IV). 
6)  Resistance backlash: Populist communicators feeding on the mainstream 
media’s and political opponents’ mediated criticism of populist political 
communication in order to communicate populist ideas and style (Articles 
II, III and IV). 
The sub-studies of this doctoral thesis focus on the permutations that explicitly 
pertain to the interaction between actors participating in producing and reacting to 
populist political communication. These types of interactions are evident in the 
populist remediation of media content, in the journalistic and civic amplification of 
populist communication, and in populist communicators’ efforts to appropriate the 
mediated scrutiny that targets them. The method, then, for investigating how the 
media system’s hybridity affects populism as a logic of articulation is to analyse the 
discursive mediated interactions between populist-party leadership, lower-level 
party representatives, journalists, anti-immigration online activists, and online 
opponents of the populist radical right. Therefore the method is based on a variety 
of qualitative textual analyses of texts from legacy and online media pertaining to 
populist communication produced by multiple actors on multiple platforms. 
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5.2 Sub-study datasets and types of analysis 
The type of interaction in which populists act as remediators of media content is 
analysed in Article I. The questions of how journalistic media and activists react to 
online populist communication and of how populist communicators react to and deal 
with external scrutiny are analysed in Articles II, III and IV. Each of the four sub-
studies has its own set of data, gathered especially for the research tasks of the 
individual articles. The different types of texts in these data sets include pieces of 
journalistic texts and textual online communication by populist-party politicians and 
individuals participating in online political activist groups. The textual analyses 
carried out in the sub-studies do not follow any formal pre-set text analysis 
methodologies, but the methods used do include characteristics of qualitative and 
quantitative content analysis, political discourse analysis, and frame analysis. 
Article I investigates how populist-party politicians are using social media to 
share and reframe political news. More specifically, it analyses how populist 
politicians appropriate and adjust journalistic framings of the news to support the 
construction of a populist chain of equivalence in the context of a salient crisis 
viewed as providing an especially fruitful discursive opportunity for nationalist 
populist parties (Ylä-Anttila and Ylä-Anttila, 2015; Railo and Välimäki, 2012a). 
Article I contains a set of Facebook posts and news stories pertaining to the Eurozone 
crisis shared by Finns Party and UKIP MPs and MEPs who were in office between 
2010 and 2015 and had a public Facebook page. The public Facebook posts were 
gathered using Netvizz, initially by gathering all posts from 43 MPs’ and MEPs’ 
public Facebook pages from the pages’ activation until the end of 2015. From this 
larger data set, all posts that did not include a reference to the Eurozone crisis and a 
link of some sort were filtered out. The final data set consisted of 296 posts that 
included a link to a news-like source covering the Eurozone crisis. The next step was 
to analyse the news stories for their hegemonic frames pertaining to the Eurozone 
crisis and then compare them with the framing (or lack of) appearing in the texts the 
politicians attached to news items. 
Article II analyses how right-wing populist-party representatives discursively 
manage accusations of racism on mainstream media platforms. The article provides 
a two-fold typology of responses populist-party representatives use to maintain an 
ambivalent rhetorical stance towards the use of exclusionary elements of populist 
radical right communication. The data set in Article II contains journalistic pieces 
from three countries’ public broadcasting services’ online news that contained an 
accusation of racism or extremism towards the Finns Party, the UKIP, or the Sweden 
Democrats. The criteria for collecting these items were as follows: the piece had to 
be published between 1 January 2010 and 31 August 2015, the piece had to contain 
an allegation or accusation of racism or xenophobia targeted at the party and the 
piece had to contain a quote from a party representative responding to the accusation. 
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The journalistic pieces were collected manually using search engines to find articles 
in which words related to racism and xenophobia appeared in tandem with the name 
of one of the three parties. The data collection was further extended with a snowball 
method by searching more articles relating to particular relevant media events. The 
final data set consisted of 58 articles on the Finns Party, 47 on the Sweden 
Democrats, and 40 on UKIP. The news pieces were coded by focusing on what kind 
of discursive damage-control strategies populist-party representatives were using to 
respond to allegations of racism. The categories of discursive damage-control 
strategies were partially derived from existing theories on racism denial (van Dijk, 
1992; 1993), image repair and crisis communication (Benoit, 2015), and populist-
party media strategies related to affiliations with racism (Wodak, 2013; 2015). These 
existing categorisations were adapted during the research process to better 
accommodate the political context of populist parties and racism accusations. The 
comparison between the parties and the clusters of strategies used played an 
important role in the analysis. Therefore, variables describing the contexts of the 
accusations and the stature of the accused actors and quoted representatives were 
implemented in coding the news pieces. 
Article III investigates what kind of conflicts related to the construction and 
upkeep of populist chains of equivalence can form when a political party becomes 
affiliated with controversial online activism. The article investigates the mediated 
scrutiny arising from the cooperation between the Finns Party and the anti-
immigration online discussion platform Hommaforum. It asks how journalists 
framed the party’s association with Homma, how these accusations were dealt with 
by the party leadership, and how the activists on Homma responded to different types 
of party leader responses. The data collected had to be conducive to an analysis of 
the dynamics between journalistic coverage, the Finns Party leader, and the 
Hommaforum activists. The data in Article III therefore consist of news articles in 
which the party leader Timo Soini answered racism accusations and the comments 
by online anti-immigration activists written in response to the news articles discussed 
on Hommaforum. The heuristic process of gathering the data involved searching 
through 45,000 discussion threads on Hommaforum, locating all thread titles in 
which the name of the party leader or the party’s name was present. As a first step, 
1,074 threads were collected. Of these threads, 204 were selected that began with a 
mainstream media story in which the political party was accused of affiliation with 
online racism, prejudice, or xenophobia. Only threads in which Hommaforum users 
commented on Timo Soini’s comments on the racism accusations were selected for 
the final analysis. The final data consisted of 78 news pieces and 1,298 individual 
comments. The articles were analysed to identify the main underlying causes for the 
racism accusations. Next, Timo Soini’s responses to the accusations were analysed 
using the typological categorisation tool created in Article II. Last, each comment 
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was coded for whether the author disapproved or approved of Soini’s responses or 
dismissed the accusations as media bias. This allowed the cross-tabulation of Soini’s 
response strategies and the Hommaforum activists’ reactions. 
Article IV analyses the practices and strategies of civic monitoring that target 
populist radical right online action and how the populist radical right online 
counterpublics react to these monitoring practices. The study investigates the 
varieties, strategies, and reception of online action that opposes the populist radical 
right in Finland in the context of Rasmus, the largest and most active explicitly anti-
racist Finnish Facebook community. The objective was to define civic monitoring as 
a type of online activism and to analyse its contents and potential consequences as a 
means of responding to online populist radical right communication. The data set for 
Article IV contains data collected from the public Rasmus Facebook group and 
several radical right Facebook groups. The full data set of almost 200,000 posts was 
filtered to locate posts that discussed the online actions of the Finnish populist radical 
right. The final data set consisted of 486 discussion threads on the Finns Party, 135 
on MV-lehti, 126 on the Soldiers of Odin, 105 on the Rajat Kiinni movement, and 
83 on Suomi Ensin. A qualitative content analysis was done on the threads to identify 
the main targets and strategies used. The Facebook pages of the five most targeted 
populist radical right actors were also collected for an analysis of how the actions of 
Rasmus activists were perceived and appropriated by the populist radical right. 
5.3 Research ethics 
Several ethical questions related to the gathering and analysing of the social media 
data must be addressed. Sets of social media data are analysed in Articles I, III, and 
IV. In Article I, where the data consist of elected politicians’ public Facebook pages, 
the ethical considerations arising from using the social media data are not as 
significant. All the data gathered and analysed in Article I were pieces of publicly 
available online texts written by elected representatives (MPs or MEPs). As 
professional politicians, these individuals can be regarded as public figures and their 
online communication as acts of political campaigning. The analytical use of such 
social media data for research purposes can be compared to analysing politicians’ 
texts published in, for example, newspapers. 
In Articles III and IV, the analyses were partially based on public social media 
data. These data sets include pieces of content produced by individuals who are not 
public figures but who are still taking part in political campaigning and online 
political discussion. I recognise that online discussion platforms such as Facebook 
pages or Hommaforum can be considered as public spaces only to a certain extent. 
People taking part in public online discussions might not actively recognise that they 
are speaking in public and that their messages will be archived (Markham and 
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Buchanan, 2012). Also, taking into consideration the political combustibility of the 
research context, I recognised that an individual’s right to remain anonymous is 
extremely important. Therefore, I also recognised that highlighting individuals’ 
online actions might theoretically cause them harm – for example, by making them 
targets for online harassment or abuse, or even by putting them in physical danger 
(Markham and Buchanan, 2012). Because of this, all research data pertaining to non-
politicians’ real or screen names have been anonymised. As most analyses focused 
on quantitative content, the individuals’ identities and textual inputs were not visible 
in the findings reported. In cases where textual excerpts from non-politicians were 
needed to illustrate the findings, the speakers’ identities were anonymised, the quotes 
were translated into English and, in the process, rephrased to prevent the speakers’ 
identification via search engines, as suggested by Annette Markham (2012). 
Sets of social media data were gathered manually (Hommaforum) or by scraping, 
using software that allows access to Facebook’s Application Programming Interface 
(API). All data collection from Facebook was done using Netvizz, which is software 
used strictly for academic purposes that allows the collection of data from public 
Facebook groups and pages (Rieder, 2013). Netvizz does not collect, store, or share 
any of the data being collected by researchers using the application. In the process 
of scraping texts and metadata from large Facebook pages and groups, data that is 
irrelevant to answering the research questions is unavoidably gathered. Therefore, 
the larger sets of Facebook data were heavily filtered to weed out such irrelevant 
data. 
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6 Summaries of the original 
publications 
In the following segment, the core empirical findings of the sub-studies are briefly 
summarised. The full studies can be found in the appendices. In the last chapter of 
the thesis, the findings of the individual sub-studies are further elaborated and 
synthesised with the previously outlined academic discussions to answer the main 
question of how populist logic operates in the hybrid media system.  
6.1 Article I: Facebook and the populist right: How 
populist politicians use social media to 
reimagine the news in Finland and the UK 
Article I investigates the role of social media in the populist remediation of financial 
crisis journalism. Crises provide populist parties with discursive windows of 
opportunity, but we know little about social media’s role in the process in which the 
mediated salience of economic recession or crisis, especially regarding coverage that 
is highly elite-driven, is appropriated to contribute to populist political 
communication. The article analyses how politicians from two parties – UKIP and 
the Finns Party – have utilized news sharing on Facebook to construct grievances, 
attribute blame, and mobilise support in the context of the Eurozone crisis between 
2010 and 2015. The findings suggest that social media provided populist politicians 
with an alternative means for rewiring the ideological contents of mainstream news 
through selective news sharing and active challenging of news frames. The study 
reveals that the studied populist-party MPs rely heavily on mainstream – instead of 
alternative – media sources, but they also actively reframe stories to provide a 
parallel populist interpretation of the news agenda. This process of running the news 
flow through a populist filter can be regarded as contributing to the news flow 
becoming more resonant and compatible with the populist demands to replace elites 
with representatives of the people. 
The findings let us re-evaluate the role of news frames as factors independently 
contributing to the appeal of online populist political communication. In some 
studies, the relationship between media and populism has been evaluated based on 
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the amount of anti-elitist and people-centrist communication presented in different 
media (Esser et al., 2018; Wettstein et al., 2018). Theories on the role of framing in 
the relationship of politics and the media have largely focused on elite-driven frame 
contests where the focus has been directed at how the news frames political events 
and thus conveys a specific understanding of society (Entman, 2004). However, as 
Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) suggest, in the hybrid media system, the framing power 
has to be rethought because “growing numbers of citizens seldom follow these 
contests attentively and (…) can select their own frames from sources beyond legacy 
media” (p. 248). Gianpetro Mazzoleni (2014) has suggested that, especially in the 
ground-laying phase of populist movements, “social media (…) have acquired a very 
special function (…) of picking up the populist output of the mass media and 
relaunching it in the wider context of the electronic public sphere, thus generating a 
favourable climate of opinion” (p. 51). Article I’s findings partially confirm this idea, 
as most pieces of crisis news do not have to be reframed by populist politicians for 
them to convey a populist idea. But the findings also make it clear that populist ideas 
can be conveyed in news sharing regardless of whether the frames of the shared 
pieces support populist thin ideology or style. Shared mainstream media content 
therefore does not have to be ideationally or stylistically populist for it to contribute 
to populist political online communication. As news content can be discursively 
reframed to support populist communication, the role of journalistic framing of 
individual grievances can be regarded perhaps as being less relevant to the 
constructing and maintaining of populist equivalential chains. 
As Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) have eloquently pointed out, in “networked 
framing” online publics can actively participate in creating and disseminating frames 
in society. The fact that mainstream news coverage is constantly being discursively 
reattributed to contribute to populist framing of news events somewhat questions the 
validity of content analyses that presuppose an existing connection between the 
hegemony of particular news frames and any real-world political developments. The 
mainstream media should therefore be regarded as significant in setting and priming 
the discussion agenda, but we should also recognise that the framing of the discussed 
topics can be highly specialised online (see also Zhou and Moy, 2007). Contrary to 
the idea of decentralisation of information sources in the hybrid media system 
(Mazzoleni, 2014: 44) and the rise of so-called “fake news” (Farkas and Schou, 
2018), online populist communication by parliamentarians and MEPs appears as the 
relatively mundane and repetitive dissemination of information pieces from popular 
mainstream sources reframed to support the idea of elites denying the people their 
sovereignty. 
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6.2 Article II: Confrontational yet submissive: 
Calculated ambivalence and populist parties’ 
strategies of responding to racism accusations 
in the media 
Article II analyses how the materiality of populist radical right online 
communication makes affiliated political parties susceptible to being targeted for 
journalistic scrutiny and how populist parties respond to this scrutiny in the 
mainstream media. The article provides a typology of the strategies used by populist-
party representatives to respond to racism accusations on mainstream media drawn 
from a systematic analysis of the responses of UKIP, Finns Party, and Sweden 
Democrats representatives in public service media between 2010 and 2015. The 
study reveals that journalistic scrutiny of populist radical right online communication 
is responded to in a way that communicates an ambivalent stance towards breaches 
of liberal democratic norms. This ambivalence is maintained using combinations of 
submissive and confrontational discursive damage-control strategies that serve 
different functions. The submissive strategies aim to appease the wider public’s 
concerns regarding racism by distancing the party from the actors causing 
controversy in action and rhetoric, by providing excuses for individual speech acts, 
and by issuing quasi-apologies. The confrontational strategies aim to appeal to voters 
who support populist radical right communication. These strategies include 
reversing accusations, not answering journalists’ questions completely, and claiming 
accusations are false. 
The study reveals in detail how, during elongated media scandals, populist 
parties can maintain ambivalence towards controversial party-affiliated 
communication. This ambivalence is maintained on the individual-representative 
level by combining submissive and confrontational strategies and on the entire-party 
level by using contradictory strategies from multiple communicators. The use of 
different strategies was observed to be linked to the organisational position of the 
representative giving the statement and of the person under accusation. The closer 
the representatives giving the statement are to the party core, the more submissive 
their responses are – that is, whereas party leaders, parliamentary group leaders, 
party secretaries, and party communication specialists tend to be submissive, the 
national and local politicians tend to be more confrontational in commenting on the 
party’s affiliation with (online) racism. Also, the stature of the person drawing the 
accusations affects the confrontational or submissive nature of responses. For 
example, cases involving low-ranking party members were significantly more likely 
to be responded to in a submissive manner, one that highlights the party’s 
denunciation of racism, compared to scandals that involve major parliamentarians. 
There were also notable differences between the parties. For instance, it appears that 
the more legitimate the party’s position is in the parliamentary system, the more 
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leeway it has to remain confrontational towards criticism over breaching liberal 
democratic norms.  
The study provides a practical analytical tool for analysing the discursive 
brokerage that is essential for populist parties to remain viable while utilizing the so-
called populist perpetuum mobile (Wodak, 2013; 2015). The study explains how 
controversial online utterances can discursively keep contributing to a party’s chain 
of equivalence without risking the loss of legitimacy among constituencies that 
might be less resonant to extreme or controversial rhetoric. A party’s stance towards 
exclusionary-populist online utterances can therefore be regarded as being 
articulated in the interplay of multiple communicators communicating different 
messages on multiple platforms. A continuation study that includes an analysis of 
the use of different strategies across mainstream and party-controlled media 
(Hatakka et al., 2018) found that Finns Party representatives tended to be 
significantly more confrontational on online media compared to mainstream media. 
This finding further confirms the key role of online counterpublics as facilitators of 
double-speak, spaces where a party organisation can utilize online populist radical 
right discourses while simultaneously claiming to denounce such talk, and, as 
elaborated later in the discussion, this process is crucial to what populist logic ends 
up articulating in the hybrid media system. 
6.3 Article III: When logics of party politics and 
online activism collide: The populist Finns 
Party’s identity under negotiation 
Article III continues the theme of Article II, focusing on the mediated interactions 
pertaining to the Finns Party’s affiliation with populist radical right online action. 
The analysis focuses on the interactions between journalists, the Finns Party leader 
Timo Soini and anti-immigration activists on Hommaforum between 2008 and 2015. 
The article suggests that utilizing an online political movement’s discourse and 
providing candidacies to core discursive leaders of an online movement can provide 
the party organisation with resources it might not otherwise be able to access. But 
cashing in on these resources also means that the heterogeneous styles and 
ideological contents of the online actors’ communication will start contributing to 
the articulation of the party’s chain of equivalence in the mediated public sphere – 
for better and for worse. Therefore, the party leadership must broker internal and 
external conflicts that arise due to the party-affiliated populist radical right 
communication being scrutinised by journalists and political opponents. On the one 
hand, the party leader must denounce extreme rhetoric but doing so risks losing 
support among anti-immigration supporters who identify with the party. 
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Article III’s findings suggest that the most effective way to retain the support of 
anti-immigration voters is to use confrontational discursive strategies when 
responding to accusations – especially by reversing accusations, answering vaguely, 
or not answering at all. The other option of choosing to take journalists and political 
opponent’s concerns over party-affiliated extremism seriously and responding to 
accusations in a submissive manner has the opposite effect – potentially leading to 
the party’s equivalential chain to start disintegrating. The analysis shows that in cases 
where Timo Soini was confrontational, his statements gained approval or the 
accusations were regarded as biased fabrications on Hommaforum. In cases when 
Soini was quoted as giving submissive statements to the media, he was met with 
vitriolic disapproval among the online anti-immigration activists. The article 
therefore reveals that journalistic scrutiny of a party’s affiliation with controversial 
online communication creates conflict between a more moderate leadership and the 
party’s more extreme online faction only when the party leadership is publicly forced 
to take distance. In all other cases, journalistic scrutiny of the party’s affiliation with 
online exclusionary rhetoric was observed to discursively tie the more radical 
activists closer to the party. Thus, even though there is an inherent disparity between 
the logics of party politics and connective online activism, the mixing of online and 
traditional media spheres in the articulation of chains of equivalence can be 
beneficial for an organisational vehicle from the point of view of gathering resources 
at the cost of increased scrutiny. 
6.4 Article IV: Expose, debunk, ridicule, resist! 
Networked civic monitoring of populist radical 
right online action in Finland 
Article IV analyses the targets, strategies, and caveats of online civic monitoring of 
populist radical right online action in the context of Rasmus, the largest explicitly 
anti-racist activist group on Finnish Facebook. This study proposes the term civic 
monitoring as a form of online connective action in which individuals or groups 
voluntarily participate in the individualised scrutiny and challenging of 
manifestations of online action they evaluate as societally harmful. Civic monitoring 
can be regarded as an extension of the institutional and journalistic scrutiny targeting 
online populist radical right communication that breaches liberal democratic norms, 
and the article discusses whether civic monitoring could complement other forms of 
monitoring in those aspects in which the latter have been observed to be inadequate. 
The study uses a content- and discourse-analytical approach to analyse 1) what forms 
of radical right online action Rasmus has monitored, 2) what kind of strategies the 
activists have employed, and 3) how these monitoring actions have been perceived 
and reacted to within radical right online publics. The findings reveal that civic 
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monitoring can agilely target various types and manifestations of radical right online 
action, compromise radical right counterpublics as safe spaces, mobilize 
counteraction and, in some cases, provide relevant information on the institutional 
linkages between online extremism and party politics for further investigation by 
journalists. 
The study reveals that when confined to a public architecture of corporate social 
media, unmoderated civic monitoring might not aid in decreasing the salience 
populist radical right action. In many cases, civic monitoring contributes to the 
visibility of cases of online extremism already exposed by journalists, providing 
momentum for the populist perpetuum mobile. Even though the inherent visibility 
of controversial online action has made far right action susceptible to scrutiny, civic 
monitoring alone – especially when it involves anti-populist preaching to the choir 
that can be easily appropriated for rhetorical counterattacks – might not have its 
intended effect of undermining the appeal of populist radical right online action. In 
particular, forms of civic monitoring that can be interpreted as hateful can prove 
counterproductive because they are easily used to reinforce a populist boundary of 
difference between a people and the malicious elites that oppose them. Overall, this 
could mean that, whereas civic monitoring provides visibility for populist radical 
right agendas and makes anti-racist activists targets for malicious counterattacks, it 
does not necessarily discourage people from sympathizing with parties that act as 
organisational vehicles for the demands expressed by the online radical right. 
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7 Conclusions and discussion: 
Populism as a political logic of 
articulation in the hybrid media 
system 
The task of this doctoral thesis was to investigate how the media system’s 
hybridisation affects the discursive articulation of chains of equivalence that act as 
the backbone of populist mobilisations and how this affects the form, contents, and 
perception of populist parties. In other words, it was analysed how the Internet’s 
increasingly prevalent role in the interactive circulation of information in society has 
affected how populist ideas are communicated and responded to in the public sphere, 
how this interactive process affects what populist organisational vehicles are 
perceived to represent, and to what extent this affects the ability of populism as a 
discursive logic to articulate viable channels for the institutionalisation of unmet 
societal demands. The questions were explored from different points of view in four 
research articles focusing on the interaction between populist-party representatives, 
journalists, and citizen activists producing and reacting to populist online 
communication in three countries. In the theoretical introduction of the thesis, the 
scope of the analysis was limited to the Finns Party and its discursive affiliation with 
online populist radical right communication. 
Populist radical right online counterpublics emancipate previously marginalised 
political ideas and styles of expression. The Internet has democratised the production 
of information, making it easier to produce and circulate ideas and political styles 
that appear anomalous compared to the mainstream. Online counterpublics 
contribute to communication between populist politicians and their supporters. The 
latter not only identify with the politicians’ message but also participate in 
contributing to communicating parallel messages in heterogeneous ways. While 
online counterpublics provide populist parties with much-needed resources for 
articulating their message, they also provide material contexts for journalistic and 
civic surveillance and monitoring. Because of the journalistic media’s attraction to 
the controversial, especially illiberal or otherwise counterhegemonic acts of 
signification tend to spill over from online counterpublics to the hegemonic public 
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sphere. Due to the way journalists and political opponents interact with online 
populist communication, the most controversial online acts of signification are likely 
to be targeted with public scrutiny. This leads the most exclusionary or otherwise 
unappreciated acts of populist communication to start affecting the public’s 
perception of the equivalential chain articulated around its organisational vehicle – 
in this case, the Finns Party. The dynamics between online populist communication, 
its public scrutiny, and the organisational actors’ responses to criticism affect how 
populism as a logic of articulation is likely to play out and how populist movements 
develop over time. This informs us that it is not only the media environment but also 
the populist communication itself that has become hybrid and that we should take 
this into consideration in populism research. 
7.1 Hybrid populist political communication  
The emergence of more horizontal, inclusive, and accessible means for political 
communication has widened the boundaries of how communities come into being 
via the populist logic of discursive articulation (Laclau, 2005). Populism provides 
political agency to groups of individuals through the discursive production of ideas 
of “us” and “them” or of “the people” and “the elites” (Canovan, 2002). These 
placeholder terms act as empty signifiers used to unite various grievances and 
societal demands to form chains of equivalence, meaning they link together various 
actors with various views as an imagined community, a “people” that aims to restore 
the sovereignty taken by “the elite” (Laclau, 2005). The media environment in which 
populism is discursively produced and performed has drastically changed towards a 
media system described as hybrid (Chadwick, 2013). In the hybrid media system, 
the spread of information takes place in multiple publics at multiple times and is 
carried out by multiple actors with multiple voices (see also Hepp and Couldry, 
2010: 9). The fact that the hybrid media system has many actors with multiple voices 
and the means to produce, circulate, and reframe information has been central to 
describing the reconfigurative power of social media (Chadwick, 2011; 2013).  
Online, individuals have more power to define why and how they participate in 
political action and what they are trying to accomplish (Bennett and Segerberg, 
2013). This means that populist movements organising around any empty signifier 
gather a large number of people with differing views and motivations to share same 
political insignia or political identities. As online platforms allow these individuals 
to publicly communicate their ideas of what their movement represents, I argue that 
the multi-voiced nature of populist communication will affect the evaluation of the 
societal worth of any affiliated political insignia, that is, the signifiers used in 
populist logic to unite actors in alliance to demand rectification of unmet societal 
demands. In non-hybrid media systems predating the Internet, people identified with 
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political (and populist) movements and participated in political action based on 
differing motivations and understandings of desired courses for action. Still, a 
distinguishing feature was missing: these individuals’ discursive actions were rarely 
public and did not gain any mediated form. Most often, extreme or otherwise 
anomalous statements made from the ranks of a movement or party would go 
unmediated and undiscussed as the communication of the movement’s collective 
goals and means for action was organised through identifiable official core 
movement organisations, leaders, and party media. Before the hybrid media system, 
individuals’ relatively mundane expression of ideas did not contribute to a similar 
extent to the public negotiation over a movement’s characteristics. Therefore, the 
hybridisation of the media system contributes to populist discursive logic in a way 
that allows a broader array of acts of signification made in online counterpublics to 
become part of the public discursive articulation of populist chains of equivalence. 
Taking this into consideration, I argue that, in the hybrid media system, populist 
communication should be regarded as hybrid in more than one sense – at least 
technologically, organisationally, ideologically, and stylistically. 
First, the production, dissemination, and scrutiny of populist political 
communication can be regarded as technologically hybrid, that is, there is no clear-
cut divide between old and new media populist communication as the logics between 
types of media and media technologies are increasingly interconnected. Party-
affiliated online communication affects acts of signification made on legacy media 
and vice versa: journalism feeds online populist communication and populist online 
communication feeds journalism. The wider mosaic of populist acts of signification 
– and also the articulation of the populist movement – is therefore formed in the 
interaction between multiple technologies and platforms of mediation. The creation 
and diffusion of populist online communication should be regarded as hybrid in 
terms of its dissemination and reach, as journalistic practices, various political logics, 
social media algorithms, and individual choices in engaging with content all affect 
what kinds of political acts of signification from the ranks of populist movements 
gain the most attention. Therefore populist logic does not only have an affinity with 
the logics of social media (Gerbaudo, 2018a; Van Dijk and Poell, 2013) but with 
those of the wider hybrid media system. The populist logic of articulation is affected 
by multiple interconnected logics, only some of which can be regarded as merely 
technological. Therefore, it is not only digital communication technologies and 
Internet-mediated communication that populism scholars should pay attention to 
when researching the role of the Internet for populism. 
Populist political communication should also be regarded as organisationally 
hybrid. As suggested in this thesis, populist political communication constitutes 
signification acts from multiple sources: party leaders, national level politicians, 
low-level party politicians, party supporters, parallel civic movements’ activists, and 
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other actors claiming to represent or viewed as representing “the people”. The online 
setting thus allows parallel communications that contribute to the same populist 
chain of equivalence by legitimate institutional actors and less legitimate extra-
parliamentary actors without any clear institutional connection between the two. The 
hybrid media system therefore makes online commenters, low-level party members, 
intra-party dissidents, and even malicious trolls potentially visible agents of 
signification participating in the public defining of the people, of the elites, and of 
the elites’ allies. These actors’ communication is not necessarily officially affiliated 
by organisation with any political party, nor is it in many cases in line with the party’s 
official platform or communication strategy. Still, they constantly contribute to the 
parallel articulation of the people and the elites in a way that may resonate with the 
party’s message and appeal to its constituencies, even though the content and style 
of the online populist radical right communications would be regarded as 
unacceptable were they made, for example, by a party MP on any mainstream media 
platform. In other words, controversial online action can become discursively 
affiliated with a populist organisational vehicle without direct organisational 
affiliation. Therefore, it can be increasingly difficult to clearly define where and 
when acts of populist communication stop contributing to the articulation of a chain 
of equivalence. This also makes the journalistic scrutiny of politicians utilizing the 
discursive field cultivated by parallel online populist communication rather 
challenging. 
It would be analytically useful to regard populist communication – also in the 
case of a single party or movement – as ideologically hybrid as different people 
participating online in the articulation of a movement bring different ideological 
contents. The transformation of the Finns Party exemplifies how a populist party can 
be just moderately anti-elitist and simultaneously radically exclusionary and nativist 
in its populism, depending on whose acts of signifying the “people”, the “elites”, and 
the elites’ allies one focuses on. This ideological hybridity resulting from multi-
voiced articulations made on multiple platforms by people with differing 
understandings of the same issues can be the reason why populist movements that 
use online media as key organisational tools – such as the 5 Star Movement – have 
been regarded as ideologically “polyvalent” (Pirro, 2018). Therefore, in the hybrid 
media system, the organisational vehicles for a chain of equivalence are likely to 
become attached to multiple thicker-ideological frameworks or their variations. 
And lastly, populist communication should be regarded as stylistically hybrid as 
the discursive ideational framework of a populist movement can be communicated 
using different styles on different media platforms and in different contexts by 
different – and sometimes even the same – actors (Hatakka et al., 2018). Finns Party 
MPs, for example, can attach similar ideological contents to their populism and use 
identical terminology as more extreme far right online activists, but the two can be 
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entirely different stylistically. Whereas core-party representatives tend to refrain 
from anti-pluralist or uncivil styles of expression especially on mainstream media 
platforms, online activists’ communication can range from well-argued and sourced 
contributions to illogical conspirationism and clear-cut racism. While only the 
institutional representatives’ style remains within the borders of acceptability, they 
both contribute to the articulation of a shared idea of society that is inherently divided 
into a particular corrupt elite and an oppressed people. This finding also pertains to 
the validity of the arguments and the factuality of the pieces of information used to 
back up populist political communication. Despite journalistic and semi-academic 
analyses of the “post-Trump era” having associated populism with computational 
propaganda, disinformation, and malicious disregard for “the truth”, this is clearly 
the case only for a fraction of all populist online communication. In particular, 
established populist-party politicians largely rely on pieces of information that can 
be regarded as accurate and factual. But at the same time, this does not mean that 
uncivil, misleading, or ideologically combustible manifestations of party-affiliated 
populist online communication would not contribute to how other parties, citizens, 
and the media perceive and react to populist parties. 
Taking the above into consideration, I argue that not only populist political 
communication but also the populist logic of articulation is inherently hybrid in the 
21st century. If we wish to understand populism in a media environment with 
multiple actors on multiple platforms negotiating meaning interactively, I suggest 
that it could be beneficial to pay closer attention theoretically to this: it is via a 
plethora of individual mediated acts of populist communication – which can vary in 
their ideological and stylistic content depending on who is speaking and in what 
context – that populist movements and their organisational vehicles become attached 
to thicker ideologies and to other contextually relevant systems of belief. Also, it 
should be recognised that only when they are brought together can individual pieces 
of populist communication be regarded as forming a larger communicational mosaic 
that articulates the chains of equivalence pertinent to the populist movement. This 
suggests that the understanding of what a populist party represents is not dictated by 
the party leader or by the party’s programmes but is formed in the complex discursive 
interaction between all actors participating in producing and reacting to populist 
communication. Following this argument, it is only in its articulation via multiple 
acts of mediated communication that populism becomes extant, alive, material, and 
real, that is, something that can be discussed, denounced, or be identified with. 
As the hybrid media system allows the overlapping and parallel communication 
of the ideas unifying unmet social demands into a chain of equivalence, this raises 
questions about the value of evaluating contemporary populist political 
communication only from the perspective of political leaders or institutional 
platforms (e.g., Hawkins and Castanho Silva, 2018). Different representatives of the 
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same political party and its adjacent online communities are contributing to the 
articulation of the same people and its enemies very differently, and the same empty 
signifiers are given different meanings by various actors in different mediated 
publics. The underlying problem for political parties or leaders is that they are 
required to act as the organisational vehicle for multiple fragmented demands that 
are articulated as part of the equivalential chain beyond their direct control. The 
multi-voiced communication of the Finns Party’s identity in the hybrid media system 
shows that a populist party can simultaneously be civil and uncivil, moderate and 
extremist, inclusionary and exclusionary, tolerant and plain racist. Therefore, 
populism research should recognise the inherent ambiguity of both populist 
communication and populist logic in the hybrid media system as populist movements 
conjure support from a wide array of grievances using multiple actors, rhetorical 
styles, and ideological contents. Therefore, the positivist attempt to reduce the 
essence of a party’s populism into few variables (e.g., Norris and Inglehart, 2019: 
Chapter 7; Hawkins and Castanho Silva, 2018) is problematic. 
7.2 Emancipation, scrutiny, and normalisation of 
controversial populist communication 
Taking into consideration the fact that populist political communication is hybrid 
and consists of various ideological and stylistic contents presented on multiple 
platforms by various actors, we should address how this affects how populist 
organisational vehicles are perceived. The normalisation of the populist radical right 
takes place through a discursive communication process involving reactions and 
counter-reactions of party organisations, activists, party supporters, journalists, 
political opponents, and the general public. The public mediated negotiation over the 
legitimacy of the populist radical right aims to define the parties’ or other 
organisational vehicles’ identities, that is, before they are accepted as legitimate and 
accepted players in representative politics, the hybrid media system provides the 
platforms for figuring out the ideological composition of the parties and their 
factions, how they wish to change society, and what kinds of values and worldviews 
they represent. Especially because populist parties and movements are often 
newcomers to political systems, they tend to have to run the gauntlet of public 
criticism, and I suggest that the ways in which this gauntlet is organised and how the 
movements defend themselves against scrutiny are factors that shape their form and 
direction. 
While it is clear that online counterpublics have many benefits for the collective 
discursive effort of constructing populist chains of equivalence around 
organisational vehicles, the hybridity of the communication makes it nearly 
inevitable that there will also be uncivil and contextually reprehensible 
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communication that will be linked back to the organisational vehicle or some other 
core signifier used by the movement. This means that populist communication 
manifesting in online publics provides stimuli, motivation, and material targets for 
public scrutiny and criticism of populist parties for journalists and political 
opponents. The populist parties’ adversaries have a special interest in framing their 
political rival’s association with questionable political ideas and style to their most 
extreme capacity. Taking into consideration their high journalistic value, potential 
to go viral, and suitability for being used in political smearing, the most controversial 
aspects of party-affiliated communication thus often become more salient in public 
discussion via their journalistic and civic amplification. 
I claim that, in the hybrid media system, the originally empty signifiers for the 
“people” are less likely to remain empty because the most polarising elements of 
populist communication taking place online are very likely to start tainting the 
mediated representation of “the people” as a whole. In other words, empty signifiers 
that are pivotal for any populist mobilisation cannot be expected to remain empty for 
long in a system where signification is horizontal and where attention is directed 
towards acts of signification that breach norms of what is regarded as acceptable. 
Thus, a political party or movement cannot expect to utilize loose populist empty 
signifiers that articulate the people and the elites for long periods before these 
signifiers are assigned meaning via the increased mediated scrutiny that targets 
controversial online communication that discursively contributes to the party’s 
equivalential chain. For the Finns Party, this meant changing from being regarded as 
a folksy anti-establishment populist party to being viewed as a populist radical right 
anti-immigration party. 
Following this, I argue that because of the media’s commercial and watch-dog 
logics, because of the algorithmic amplification of the controversial, and because 
populist online communication is also monitored by political opponents and 
concerned citizens, it is the most controversial aspects of populist communication 
that are likely to become the most visible, discussed, and interacted-with forms of 
populism in the public sphere. The scrutinised elements of populist communication 
are therefore rarely related to the inclusive elements of populist communication but 
instead are related to particularly counterhegemonic acts of signification that contain 
exclusionary and illiberal ideas or an abrasively uncivil style. In the context of the 
populist radical right in liberal democracies, these elements are almost always related 
to nativism, authoritarianism, and racism. I suggest that this means that, in the hybrid 
media system, the societal merit and value of the signifiers that act as carriers for an 
equivalential chain will be mostly likely evaluated based on their most controversial 
counterhegemonic elements. For example “the Finns Party” and “immigration 
scepticism” as signifiers used to form an equivalential chain have become strongly 
associated with racism, extremism, islamophobia, and xenophobia because the 
Conclusions and discussion: Populism as a political logic of articulation in the hybrid media system 
 79 
online setting amplified by traditional media has allowed these elements to 
contribute continually to the articulation of the party’s identity, and the party 
leadership has not yet to take clear action to unequivocally discourage and denounce 
such talk. 
As Articles II and III reveal, public mediated scrutiny can be useful for populist 
parties depending on their chosen discursive strategy when responding to criticism. 
Populist parties do have tools for brokering scrutiny to maintain an ambivalent stance 
that allows them to hold on to controversial online discursive assets without risking 
the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the wider public. Institutional leaders of populist 
parties therefore can discursively broker to what extent online articulations are given 
power to contribute to the understanding of what the party represents. This also 
means that populist leadership in the hybrid media system is not only about 
producing and disseminating populist communication but increasingly a task of 
brokering internal and external conflict (Article III) that emerges from the visibility 
of controversial affiliated acts of communication that are useful for gaining support 
but can be detrimental to the party’s public image. 
The brokering of conflict between the parts of the chain of equivalence could be 
regarded as the cost of cashing in on radical communication taking place in online 
counterpublics, and this brokering necessitates constant discursive maintenance of 
the unity of “the people”. If a party wishes to hold on to a loose understanding of 
“the people” and to keep benefitting from ideologically or stylistically controversial 
online communication, it must communicate a permissive stance towards illiberal 
communication acts. If party leadership selected a confrontational discursive 
strategy for responding to criticism over the scrutinised communication acts, this 
would likely mean that controversial online communication would remain associated 
with the party and be normalised over time. Public scrutiny targeting the party 
therefore can create conflict between the party and the actors causing the mediated 
controversy only if the party leadership were to take distance and condemn the 
criticised actions. The problem is that populist leaders might not be willing to do so 
as it is cost-effective to remain confrontational or even openly hostile towards 
criticism regarding extremism. Therefore, populist leaders dealing with accusations 
are prone to using confrontational discursive strategies that rely on heightening the 
boundary of difference between “the people” and “the elite” to explain why their 
party is artificially being smeared with journalists’ and political opponents’ biased 
allegations. Therefore, even long-lasting and prevalent mediated scrutiny targeting 
the most controversial elements of populist parties’ communication seems 
ineffective in ridding them of their ability to successfully cater to constituencies that 
are drawn in by radical right communication. In fact, it is likely to do just the 
opposite, causing populist parties to spiral further into antagonism and anti-
pluralism. 
Niko Hatakka 
80 
By remaining confrontational towards accusations of extremism, the populist 
radical right can be regarded as being in a win-win situation. If potential supporters 
are attracted to exclusionary or anti-pluralist elements of populist communication, 
then they are likely to support the party for expressing them. If individuals feel that 
the highlighted exclusionary acts of signification amplified by the media are not at 
the core of what their movement represents, then they will likely perceive or at least 
entertain the idea that the media’s and political opponents’ portrayal of their 
“people” has been a misrepresentation. This perception could make individuals more 
attuned to accepting populist communication that claims that elites are trying to 
invalidate justified societal demands by presenting bastardised versions of them. 
When this effect of perceived misrepresentation is combined with populist-party 
representatives’ confrontational strategies for responding to criticism by heightening 
the discursive divide between “the people” and “the elite”, the hybrid media system 
is likely to contribute to making the party’s equivalential chain more focused and 
pronounced – contributing to the party’s gravitation towards more extreme forms of 
populism that cater to the logics of news values, algorithms, and reciprocal political 
agitation. The intertwining of the logics of populism and the hybrid media system 
therefore could be used to partially explain why the most successful populist 
movements of the 2010s tend to verge on the radical and are openly hostile towards 
opposition. 
7.3 Is populist logic less likely to be a democratic 
corrective in the hybrid media system? 
As the hybrid media system increases the salience of the least-appreciated elements 
of populist communication as core characteristics of populist movements, how does 
this affect populist movements’ ability to institutionalise unmet societal demands in 
liberal parliamentary democracies? The mainstream media and political opponents 
participate in providing populist empty signifiers with meaning by scrutinising 
controversial populist discursive actions made visible and material on online 
platforms. The scrutiny arising from the hybridisation of the media system reduces 
the vagueness of empty signifiers as uniting symbols, which means they are likely 
to become less effective as tools for gathering support as widely as possible. This 
thesis suggests that, for populist parties, the best way to counter the disintegration of 
their populist chain of equivalence is to discursively heighten the antagonistic 
frontier between the people and the elites – for example, by reversing accusations 
and claiming that the media are biased (Articles II and III). As controversial acts of 
signification and their rebuttals are made more prevalent, the hybrid media system 
facilitates the unceasing creation of mediated micro-events that feed into the 
performing and intensifying of antagonism especially because, for the populists, 
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being confrontational is the most functional strategy for responding to external 
attempts to break the populist chain of equivalence. The phenomenon of media 
hostility among parties and movements could therefore be viewed as a discursively 
effective response to journalists’ and activists’ efforts to make populist empty 
signifiers less vague. This explains why hostility towards the media is such a 
prevalent feature in especially most populist radical right movements. 
The individual studies of this thesis do not comprehensively answer the question 
of why the hybrid media system tends to highlight controversial populist 
communication. The answer is most likely related to journalistic values and 
practices, to the logics of political competition, and to the algorithmic design of 
online platforms that promotes content that gathers the most interactions. I encourage 
further populism research that recognises that it is not only the logic of social media 
as a technological means of circumventing gatekeepers that contributes to the 
normalisation of radical right populism, but that it is also the mediated interactions 
between actors in the hybrid media system that do so. Therefore, when analysing or 
discussing populist online communication and its role in the rise of populist political 
parties, one must consider that there are different ways of communicating populist 
ideas and style within populist parties and that certain kinds of communications are 
more alluring in terms of being amplified by the media and political opponents. It is 
not populism overall that should be (or is) challenged, but the fact that when populist 
actors insist on keeping their identification requirements loose, that is, remain 
permissive or ambivalent towards controversial affiliated or parallel acts of 
signification, that the logics of the hybrid media system turn their institutional 
organisations into carriers for the most unappreciated elements of populist 
communication. As argued above, this process can be extremely relevant for the 
future direction and corrective democratic potential of populist movements. Party 
leaders have a key role in deciding what articulations are allowed in the party and 
thus in defining to what extent the more extreme ideas of, for example, the online 
radical right are normalised in the public sphere and ultimately institutionalised via 
elections. This means that the ways in which populist-party representatives respond 
to criticism regarding their party’s affiliation with exclusionary, illiberal, or even 
illegal communication do not just affect the public image of the party, they also affect 
the process of discursive articulation in which these acts of signification are 
normalised as part of the movement’s chain of equivalence. In other words, parties’ 
public communication regarding their perceived affiliation with extreme action will 
affect what the parties are likely to become institutional channels for. 
Because of the hybridity of populism in the hybrid media system, a non-radical-
right populist movement that allows populist radical right communication from 
within its ranks is likely to eventually become populist radical right in nature unless 
the movement’s leadership publicly and unequivocally denounces such 
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communication, thus limiting its access to contributing to the movement’s collective 
discursive construction of the people and the elites. Therefore, public scrutiny – be 
it journalistic or civic – targeting controversial elements of populist communication 
should be framed such that politicians have difficulty in constructing ambivalence 
via, for example, confrontational strategies. As this thesis shows, merely increasing 
the salience of online extremism can contribute to these elements becoming an 
inherent part of a party’s equivalential chain via the interactive discursive process 
described above. The most efficient way to decrease political parties’ chances of 
being able to utilize online extremism is not to make the controversial parts of the 
chain of equivalence more visible but to create intra-party discussion and conflict. 
The key is to force party actors and voters into introspection regarding whether these 
elements represent what they as individuals are willing to support. This would 
require populist leaders to respond unambiguously regarding their party’s affiliation 
with exclusionary and anti-pluralist communication, which is easier said than done. 
And for leaderless and more abstract populist movements – ones that organise 
around hashtags, for example – this problem is even more pronounced. 
I agree with most scholars that populism can be a threat and a corrective for 
democracy (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Making this evaluation is entirely 
contextual and a derivative of the ideological contents to which populism is attached 
and of how the conflictual nature of the people, the elites, and the elites’ allies is 
stylistically performed. Populism can correct deficits of representation by providing 
legitimate channels for institutionalising unmet societal demands (Laclau, 2005), but 
populism can also attach itself to movements and ideological bases that are directly 
against democracy, or at least its liberal components (e.g., Müller, 2016). This study 
shows that the articulations voiced by and attributed to a particular movement form 
a hybrid mosaic of multiple voices, of which some can be highly exclusionary. Some 
of these voices can be directly linked to the party organisation; some are involved 
only loosely. Some of the voices might not have any organisational connection 
whatsoever but can still contribute to an ideologically and stylistically parallel 
articulation of a populist equivalential chain. As described in the main argument of 
this dissertation, these acts of signification are interacted with in the hybrid media 
system in a way that could make populism less conducive to fulfilling its theoretical 
promise as a means of institutionalising unmet societal demands. 
In populism, the signifiers for the people and its adversaries are vaguely 
constructed because this is key to the signifiers remaining effective in being able to 
unite heterogeneous unmet societal demands (Laclau, 2005: 40). This thesis points 
out that mediated scrutiny of the contents of populist movements in the hybrid media 
system tends to deny populist signifiers the ability to remain empty and thus makes 
them less vague and, as such, less effective in uniting a wide spectrum of different 
unmet political demands. According to Laclau, the success of a populist mobilisation 
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is the “crystallisation” of empty signifiers into a permanent system of identification 
that affects the whole field of politics (Laclau, 2005). In the Finnish case, the 
“people” represented by the Finns Party has started to crystallise around a base of 
online populist radical right communications made salient by mediated scrutiny as 
the mediated responses from the journalists and activists to this communicational 
mosaic have weighted heavily toward exclusionary communication. The hybrid 
media system empowered populist radical right communication within the Finns 
Party’s chain of equivalence and helped establish a parliamentary channel for 
responding to grievances and demands related to immigration. The populist radical 
right ideas and style voiced online were originally marginal, but as they were picked 
up by the media, they ended up key attributes or hegemonic frames by which people 
denounced or identified with the party. The Finns Party losing its place in 
government is thus directly linked to how the hybrid media system affects populism 
as a political logic of articulation. 
Chantal Mouffe (2018) – like Laclau – views populism as the pursuit of 
challenging hegemony. According to her, society is inherently “divided and 
discursively constructed through hegemonic practices”, and therefore all that is 
political contains “a dimension of radical negativity” (pp. 10, 87). She states that 
there can be no politics without populism and that democracy needs the expression 
of competing visions to remain healthy. Therefore, the “populist moments” we are 
witnessing could be regarded as the “return of the political” after decades of post-
politics. But Mouffe (2018) also points out that this struggle should not be 
antagonistic in the sense that it would create conflict that is incompatible with 
pluralism. Her idea of agonistic democracy suggests that the public sphere should be 
a space of vividly expressed competing ideas based on conflictual values but free of 
wishes to eradicate the opposition. This dissertation’s findings on the polarising 
effect of the hybrid media system on the logic of populism suggest that there are 
inherent dangers in trusting that populism as a logic of articulation can be contained 
to remain constructive, inclusive, and pluralist in the contemporary media 
environment. 
To increase their chances of becoming popular, a populist party or movement 
must keep the signifiers for its “people” as loose as possible, making it possible for 
a wide range of individuals to identify with the core symbols and signifiers that link 
political demands into a chain of equivalence. But as the hybrid media system lowers 
the threshold for various actors to participate publicly in the articulation of these core 
symbols and signifiers, populism itself – as a discursive logic of articulating the 
people and its adversaries – will become technologically, organisationally, 
ideologically, and stylistically hybrid. And in this hybrid articulation, it is the most 
controversial elements of populist communication that form the basis for evaluating 
the societal worth and acceptability of populist movements. By making the most 
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controversial elements more salient, the media system also facilitates their political 
use as points of identification, which can lead to the normalisation of these elements 
as the hegemonic mode of discourse through which populism is articulated. 
Therefore, when populist logic is unleashed in a media environment where the 
politics of signification are horizontal and public, it can be nearly impossible for the 
articulation of populist chains of equivalence to remain agonistic. 
According to the main theoretical contribution of this thesis, the hybrid logics of 
engaging in and with multi-voiced populist communication in the current media 
environment contribute to controversial articulations of populist chains of 
equivalence becoming hegemonic. The hybrid media system encourages evaluations 
of the worth of populist movements based on the scrutiny of the least-appreciated 
elements used in communicating the ideas of “the people” and “the elites”. And if 
the hybrid media system acts as an amplifier and facilitator for mainly antagonistic 
forms of populist communication, this can make movements following populist logic 
less viable to institutionalise their political demands successfully. Recognising how 
populist logic operates in the hybrid media system could help resolve the theoretical 
dispute between the Essex School and the ideational approach regarding the 
prevalence of anti-pluralism at the core of populism. Theoretically populist 
movements do not have to be anti-pluralist, but because of the way populist logic 
manifests itself in the hybrid media system, they will most likely appear like they 
are. This likely leads either to the disintegration of populist movements’ chains of 
equivalence or to the further consolidation of confrontational antagonism as one of 
the movements’ core discursive elements. Therefore, populism as a political logic of 
articulation functions in the hybrid media system in a way that encourages populist 
organisational vehicles to gravitate towards extreme forms of populism. 
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